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Introduction:
“Caste remains a key determinant of a person’s future. This is perfectly reflected in India’s labor
market, which is more governed by laws of social origin than by statutory legislation. Moreover,
violation of caste rules by Dalits seeking to break caste-related employment barriers is prone to
severe punishment from dominant castes, including economic boycotts and even physical violence”
Taken from the India Exclusion Report 2014
0.1 Motivation
The discourse of caste discrimination in India is fraught with contentious debate and
disagreements on the relevance of caste as an identity category in contemporary India. While the
present state of abject poverty and poor quality of life standards among many scheduled and
backwards castes is widely observed to be a result of past social stratification and exclusion, whether
former stereotypes and prejudices continue to plague disenfranchised castes is disputed. There are
those who believe that because India has passed laws that forbids discrimination based on caste, the
generally destitute socioeconomic circumstances that backwards castes find can be described as an
issue of skill gaps and human capital deficiencies. Many extoll the virtues of the competitive market
in affording scheduled and backward castes an unprecedented level of mobility that, in combination
with the reservation system, have led to increases in their overall literacy rates, likelihood to gain
employment, and quality of life. Individuals such as Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar, from the
Cato institute, who wrote in 2015,
“The arrival of the competitive market and its creative destruction broke old caste bonds and
facilitated the shift of Dalits to new occupations. India’s socialist policies achieved only 3.5 percent
annual growth for decades. Licenses and permits were required for all economic activity. Uppercaste networks monopolized these and kept Dalits out. But the 1991 economic reforms dismantled
controls, accelerating growth and competition. Fierce competition soon ensure that the price of a
supplier mattered more than his caste. This created opening for dalit entrepreneurs, who were able
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to crack traditional upper-caste monopolies. The dalit revolution is still in its early stages, but is
unstoppable.” 1
The inspiration for work undertaken in this senior project comes from a disagreement with
the above statement, which implies that the caste system’s relevance in contemporary India is fading,
and that the relative increases in backward caste economic position throughout much of the nation
is indicative of the competitive market’s success in ‘leveling the playing field’ between castes. This
paper finds problematic Aiyar’s insistence on caste’s supposedly increasing irrelevance as an identity
category in the modern context, his belief that economic liberalization spurred unprecedented caste
mobility, that the competitive market functioned to diminish upper-caste influence in a manner better
than legislation. In the ensuing chapters, this paper seeks to undermine erroneous neoclassical
frameworks developed to describe labor market discrimination that defend the competitive market’s
ability to combat widespread identity-based inequality. These conceptualizations of caste’s relevance
in India are deeply problematic as they frame caste-discrimination as a problem of the past, with
current observed labor market inequalities thus implied to be the result of SC and OBC human capital
variances. Consequently, the social order established by the caste system is largely ignored as a
potential factor in producing these inequalities. With this framework in mind, this paper attempts to
answer a three-part question, ‘how well do established neoclassical theories of economic
discrimination apply to/explain the visible instances of caste-based labor market inequalities, do their
results reflect reality, and is a capitalist competitive market truly the saving grace for backward castes
as many have hypothesized?”
0.2 Brief History of the Caste System
To begin, it is important to understand that the caste system has existed, in various forms,
throughout India for generations. Since the history of the caste system is not the focus of this paper,
it will not be discussed at length. however, it is useful to note that caste has theological underpinnings

1

Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar, Capitalism’s Assault on the Caste System: How Economic Liberalization Spawned
Low-Caste Dalit Millionaires, 1.
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in Hinduism, was utilized as a system of convenient social organization by the British colonizers
during their occupation of India, and was widely practiced throughout the nation until its abolishment
in the past century. It is generally understood that there are four castes, referred to as varnas, with
thousands of sub-castes and communities within each of these varnas that are known as jatis. The
caste system is hereditary, and there are many ways to identify an individual’s caste identity – for
example, an individual’s last name, village of origin, clothing, or even occupation can indicative,
with varying degree of certainty, their caste. The four varnas are, in descending hierarchical order:
Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaisya, and Shudra. A simplified understanding of each of these varnas goes as
follows: the Brahmin were the religious elite, Kshatriyas were warriors and nobility, Vaisya were
“farmers, traders and artisans” and Shudras were “tenant farmers, and servants.” 2 The roles and
responsibilities seen as sacrilegious or unclean were relegated to a caste outside of this hierarchy,
referred to colloquially as “untouchables”. Untouchables, or Dalits to use a more general term, were
subjected to perhaps the most severe societal marginalization among the caste groups. An
individual’s varna and jati determined their appropriate, religiously ordained societal role and, in
many cases, their ability to engage in political activities. Since socioeconomic status is closely tied
with one’s societal role, caste often served as a determinant of quality of life. It follows that
restrictions such as those related to access to land, public services, education, proper nutrition,
health-care, credit, and other aspects that determine an individual’s overall productivity are closely
tied are historically tied to caste.3 Up until the latter half of the 20th century, the period when caste
discrimination was made illegal and the Mandal commission introduced the reservation system, caste
identity expressly determined these restrictions for most Indians. Discriminatory practices on the
base of cast background has been ostensibly outlawed throughout India for six decades. Article 15
of the Indian Constitution, ratified into law in the 1950s, in fact prohibits any sort of discrimination

2

Kallie Szczepanski History of India’s Caste System
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against those historically marginalized castes, and programs enforcing positive discrimination in
hopes of equalizing the socioeconomic playing field have been instituted ever since the 1950s.
Certainly, to a degree, these programs coupled with a generally widespread desire towards abolishing
this archaic mode of inherited, hierarchical socioeconomic division have had their benefits on the
untouchable caste. Within some urban environments, at the very least, it seems to hold true that most
modern occupations are not strictly withheld to lower castes, and thus greater upward mobility exists
in that regard. Untouchable castes, Dalits, and scheduled tribes have also experienced an increase in
their access to education in part due to the affirmative action policies set in place and enforced with
at least a modicum of regularity throughout the nation. Throughout this paper of discussion on caste,
terms such as “backwards”, “lower”, “disadvantaged”, “scheduled” or “Dalit” will be used to
describe the untouchable cast. It should be noted that these caste categorizations refer, for the most
part unless specified differently, to castes that are historically branded as untouchable. It should
stated that this is done so both in this project as well as throughout much of the literature discussed
partly for the sake of convenience as there are hundreds of caste sub-classifications that greatly
complicate the task of extrapolating individual sub-caste experiences and treatment from one
another. The markers of untouchability are vast, multi-faceted, and easily distinguishable, which
allows researchers and professionals from various academic fields to classify castes in this
homogenous manner without fear of undermining specific sub-caste struggles. Of course, this
universalizing treatment of caste categories does not suggest there to be no inter-caste inequalities
of note; rather, the implication is that even among these diverse sub-caste categories, overarching
shared markers of untouchability persist such that the inter-group differences are of little import to
their disproportionate treatment at the hands of the upper-castes. In other words, a prejudicial uppercaste Brahmin seeking to hire an employee would likely pay little consideration to the differences
between two subsets of an untouchable caste as whatever distinctions may be apparent between these
two sub-groups necessarily do not rid them of the shared negative religious and structural
connotations that are ascribed upon the untouchable caste.

Khanna 5

In regards to social stratification and prejudicial treatment, caste relations bare resemblance
to the way in which black-white or male-female binaries are conceptualized. Within the United
States, black individuals continue to suffer from the institutional racism that can trace much of its
origin, at least in this nation’s context, to their enslavement at the hands of white colonizers. Black
individuals were routinely forced into both brutal physical labor or menial house work, with the
occupational distribution of these positions itself determined by the dominant groups perceptions on
skin-tone’s relation to productivity. After slavery’s abolishment, the racism and social order that
determined black socioeconomic and political positionality did not cease to exist as some believe;
rather, over time, they became ingrained in the societal ideology and political institutions present
within the United States. It took centuries for integration to occur in the United States, both in regard
to education and occupation, and even when legislation passed that expressly forbade discriminatory
practices, racism simply adapted to the times. This is an incredibly simplified version of race
relations within the United States, but for the purposes of this paper, racism’s ability to persist
through unenforced social codes derived from persistent historical social stratification is crucial to
the discussion of caste. For centuries, Dalit life was restricted based on rigidly prescribed social
codes that, once abolished, allotted them a greater degree of freedom, but in no way afforded them
equal socioeconomic or political treatment with regards to higher castes. As racism became ingrained
within the laws and institutions of the United States as well as outside of them, caste-discrimination
can be understood as having followed a similar trajectory. These resemblances have allowed for
economic theories of discrimination, written in large part to describe the black-white and femalemale relations in the United States, to be utilized to better understand India’s caste relations.
0.3 Thesis Statement
Therefore, to return to the central question proposed above, this paper’s purpose is to
critically analyze and assess previous economic inquiries into the subject of caste-based
discrimination in the context of India after 1990. Through this analysis, it challenges many
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neoclassical beliefs; the primary being that wage differentials and occupational segregation apparent
between marginalized and privileged castes resolve themselves in the long-run. The first chapter is
primarily concerned with outlining and deconstructing the various theories of economic
discrimination, assessing their relevance and validity in the context in which they were developed.
Chapter two proceeds with a discussion on those theories as they pertain to India’s caste
communities, assessing their ability to explain accurately both in and out-market inequalities. This
chapter also provides evidence on the current state of Dalit socioeconomic well-being compared to
that of the upper castes, showing that the material differences between the two groups persist despite
competitive market forces. Chapter three focuses entirely on observed caste wage differentials
produced by several economists over varying periods of time, regions, industries and markets with
the goal of constructing a holistic view of the wage gap. This chapter also discusses the validity of
regression analysis in analyzing discrimination. Finally, chapter four contains the projects conclusion
as well as a brief policy suggestion predicated on the analysis done in the previous sections.
Ultimately, this paper argues that the standard neoclassical framework on economic
discrimination, found in the logic of ‘taste-based’ or ‘statistical’ discrimination, is unproductive and
counterintuitive in its treatment of discrimination, which is exemplified in the context of caste
relations within India. It further argues that observed in-market inequalities between SC and OBCs
throughout various regions of India are both a result of differences in endowments between the castes
as well as the persistence of harmful socially exclusionary caste values outside the labor market that
continue to affect in-market outcomes. Finally, in this vein, it concludes that, in order to combat
labor market inequalities, affirmative action legislation, such as the reservation system, should be
emboldened in the private sector as it has been shown to be beneficial in increasing Dalit
socioeconomic and political agency; however, legislation must also adopt a focus on combatting the
persistence of caste within the social order in order for it to be productive in the long-run.
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Chapter One: A Discussion on the Theories of Economic Discrimination
1.1 The Value of Economics in Discussing Discrimination
This chapter will explore the various economic theories of discrimination, offering briefly a
timeline and analysis of the topic along with its prominent figures and their respective contributions.
Unpacking Gary Becker’s theories on discrimination will serve as a starting point, from which the
following works within the discipline will be framed as a development from or response to the
theories Becker initially espoused. It will delve into the criticisms levied against Becker, the validity
of his arguments and their place in the context of their intended framework within the United States
so as to set up the proceeding chapters’ analysis of caste-based discrimination throughout India. This
chapter ultimately serves to explain how economics traditionally treats discrimination in the labor
market with the goal of discerning its value in the discussion of prejudicial treatment against
marginalized peoples.
Conceptualizing discrimination through the lens of economic analysis provides perspectives
unlike those offered by other disciplines. Sociological studies of discrimination are less concerned
with the cognitive processes and individual preferences as they are with explaining larger, structural
phenomena that result from or can be explained through prejudice. By contrast, many of economics’
theoretical underpinnings hinge on understandings of the individual, their decision-making
processes, and their value systems. The disciplines’ similarities rest in their shared desire to
understand social stratification, but their methodologies and subsequent results can differ
dramatically. Similarly, psychology, while certainly integral to understanding the individual, holds
a greater concern for these cognitive processes than economics. Political inquiry is frequently located
within discussions on marginalized groups themselves with a focus on legality and impact as
opposed to causation.
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Each of these disciplines respectively inform economic analyses, which are centered on the
larger debate of the existence of discrimination as well as where and how it can be observed. Of
course, each of these fields address these questions in their own manner; however, economics is able
to put forth tangibility to the notion of discrimination by demarcating it, at times, through monetary
terms and within the context of various markets. Adopting and reformulating ideas, theories and
metrics from these different academic areas, economists attempt to place discrimination firmly
within the realm of materiality. In other words, through critically analyzing and discussing employer
hiring criteria, wage differentials, and the effects of policy on curtailing unequal treatment,
economics can offer a concrete dimension to the debate on discrimination as well as the ways in it
which it manifests itself in the lives of marginalized individuals.
1.2 Pioneers of Economic Discrimination
Gary Becker published his seminal piece on discrimination aptly titled “The Economics of
Discrimination” in 1957, and in it provided an immensely prolific and hotly debated theory on how
and why certain employers discriminate against individuals based on their race. Becker’s discussion
focuses on the relationship between white employers and black workers within the United States in
the 1950s, a time characterized by heavy racial tensions between a clearly oppressed minority and
an explicitly prejudicial majority. Becker viewed racism “as an aversion towards cross-racial
interaction” and formulated economic models that postulated employers as discriminatory if their
desire to hire black workers was influenced by their racial predilections.4 In defining racism as such,
Becker was able to characterize employers on a gradient whose bounds were, respectively, totally
averse to racial comingling and, at the other end, entirely indifferent to the subject.
This model views discriminatory employers as desiring a great degree of distance between
themselves and the race they hold prejudicial, non-pecuniary values towards. Desiring distance,

4

Kerwin Kofi Charles & Jonathan Guryan, Prejudice and Wages: An Empirical Assessment of Becker’s The Economics
of Discrimination, 774
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employers will sacrifice income in order to hire workers whose marginal productive value (MPV) is
lower than their marginal cost (MC) instead of one whose MPV and MC are the same on the
condition that the latter candidate is black and the former white. Discriminatory employers suffer a
disutility from hiring black workers that is unrelated to their productive capacity, and since, in this
model, the labor market features equally qualified prospective employees regardless of race, the
aforementioned employers will make the conscious decision to suffer net production losses so as to
satiate their prejudicial tastes. Becker defines this discriminatory employer’s cost of hiring a black
worker as w(1+d) where “w” is the nominal wage and “d” is the employer’s subjective disutility,
which varies based on the value of their taste for discrimination. It should be noted that “d”, also
known as the discrimination coefficient, does not refer to how racist the employer is; rather, it
indicates “the intensity of the disutility experienced by the individual discriminator.5” Becker’s
model assumes perfect competition, constant returns to scale as far as production is concerned, and
further specifies two conditions.6 The first condition defines employer utility as Vi = πi -diLb, where
πi represents profit, and diLb describes the disutility felt by the employer as a result of their black
portion of their labor force.7 The second condition outlines the utility maximizing choices as:
f’(Lb + La) – wa ≤ 0, with equality if La > 0
f’(Lb + La) – wb - di ≤ 0, with equality if Lb > 08
This second condition frames employer utility as a function of the combined black and white
labor force minus the wage costs for the respective races as well as the discrimination coefficient in
the case of black workers. Given that the workers are treated as perfect substitutes for one another,
this condition utilizes the discrimination coefficient di to show the difference between those
employers who hold prejudice against blacks and those who do not. For instance, an employer with

5
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a di will be forced to employ fewer black employees and more white employees than their less
discriminatory competitor. Under the assumption of perfect competition, this act of discrimination
would, in the short run, lead to a higher demand and subsequent wage for white workers than for
their black counterparts. Consequentially, wage prices for black workers could be defined as wb =
wa - di as their demand would be lower and thus they would be willing to accept employment at a
lower wage.9 This condition highlights the crux of Becker’s argument in two manners. In one regard,
it shows that discriminatory employers are to be treated as if they are not profit oriented in the
traditional sense. While still maximizing their over-all utility, their profit suffers because they pay
higher wages for white workers despite having the option to hire black workers at a lower cost. Next,
this condition indicates that employers who suffer great disutility from employing black workers
will, in the long-run, be pushed out of the market by employers with a lower discrimination
coefficient. This prediction rests on the notion that, in this perfectly competitive market, employers
who suffer less disutility from hiring black workers can minimize their cost of labor, and thus
increase their profits. The latter group of employers would be able to pay less for effectively the
same amount of labor, which would be to the short run detriment of black workers; however, in the
long-run, Becker argues that the wage gap would decrease due to the lack of prejudiced employers.
In the short-run, Becker’s theory predicts that the relative wages between black and white
workers is contingent upon the marginal discriminator, supply of labor, and distribution of racial
preferences. Figure 2 from Kofi & Guryan illustrates the relationship between each of these factors.

9

ibid

Khanna 12

Fig. 2

Figure 2 represents the ratio of black to white wages on the y-axis, and the ratio of black to
white labor supply on the x-axis. At S1, the distribution of racial preferences is relative to the small
black-white labor ratio, thus creating an equilibrium wherein there is no racial wage gap (i.e wb/wa
= 1).10 In other words, there are fewer black workers compared to white workers and the distribution
of racial preferences is such that there are enough non-prejudiced employers hiring black workers to
offset the need for prejudiced employers to hire them. The labor supply is distributed among the
prejudiced and non-prejudiced employers in a manner ideal to black workers, who are being paid the
same amount as their white counterparts. However, when the distribution of racial preferences does
not change to accommodate an increase in the ratio of Lb to La, then the supply curve shifts to S2.
This new labor ratio represents an increase in the supply of black workers relative to white workers
in the market, forcing some of the prejudiced employers to hire the former, which in turn causes
them to face greater disutility. As a result, the demand for black workers relative to white workers
decreases, pushing the equilibrium wage-ratio to R’.11 This model assumes that black workers are
sorted to the least-prejudiced employers before being compelled towards those with higher
propensity to discriminate. The key agent in determining the cut-off point between the two groups

10
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of employers is the marginal discriminator rather than the average level of prejudice among all
employers. In essence, black workers will be hired such that the wage-ratio remains constant until
the point where the marginal discriminator’s prejudice is located at the percentile equal to the percent
of the black workforce in the population.
In summary, Becker’s argues that racial discrimination in the labor market hinges on there
existing an inverse relationship between the ratio of black to white workers and black wages. He
further indicates that that the marginal discriminator matters more in determining the wage gap than
the average level of prejudice. Moreover, Becker contends that market pressures sort black workers
away from prejudicial employers. Finally, the model holds that the concentration of prejudicial
attitudes matter more to higher wage gaps in the left tail of the prejudice distribution, which is less
discriminatory, than in the right.12 The primary take-away from Becker’s assertions is that
discrimination poses a cost to employers, indicating that wage-gaps existing in the short-run will be
eliminated in the long-run.
1.3 Criticisms of Gary Becker’s ‘taste-based’ approach to discrimination
Despite its keen insights into the nature of employer discrimination, Becker’s theory has
become the subject of varied criticism since its publication. Many contend that Becker is too quick
to construct discrimination as a desire to maintain distance between the privileged individuals and
their marginalized counterparts. There also exists the issue of categorizing and measuring such an
abstract disinclination in corporations, which are typically seen as impersonal as those who make
hiring decisions are not likely to be working alongside their candidates in most cases.13 From a
historical perspective within the United States, according to the historian William Sundstrom
distance was not necessarily the qualifying factor in explaining labor market discrimination.
Prejudiced Southern whites, despite opposing integration, for the most part maintained that blacks

12
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and whites could work together in close proximity as long as the former group “didn’t cross the
line.”14 Of course, there are clear problems with this criticism, the first of which is that distance is
inherently implied by virtue of there existing a metaphorical line that black individuals could not
cross. More concretely, this argument also diminishes the role that deeply entrenched values
espoused by many Southern white proponents of segregation, who, again by nature of their desire to
keep the workforce divided by race, desired at the very least a certain degree of distance between
themselves and their black counterparts.
However, as Figart & Mutari point out, Sundstrom’s argument lends credence to the notion
that Becker has difficulty reconciling his theory with the existence of job roles that were traditionally
associated with black individuals.15 In this regard, Becker’s theory falls short of explaining the
overall nature of employer discrimination as the occupational structures of labor markets, even those
outside of the United States, can be historically determined. Barbara Bergmann (1971) finds that
there does exist a unique under and overrepresentation of black individuals in particular industries.16
In occupations that require vocational training (electrician, foremen, mechanics etc.), there is a
distinct underrepresentation of black individuals, whereas those that do not have such requirements
(Shipping and Receiving clerks, plasterers, truck drivers etc.) they are overrepresented. A compelling
case can be made that this is the result of pre-market discrimination, discussed in the following
sections; however, the fact that occupational segregation exists could also be related to historical
standards. Positions that are more physically demanding and labor intensive were predominately
filled by black men, which is a partial manifestation of the history of slavery and indentured servitude
throughout the Untied States. Granted, Bergmann’s work concerned the state of affairs as detailed
by the 1960s U.S Census. However, 1960s America was still characterized by heavy racial tensions,
when such blatant occupational discrimination would be expected. Certain industries could present
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unique barriers to entry for marginalized groups depending on their sociopolitical positionality
within their nation. The opposite also applies, as certain industries could be preferential towards a
marginalized group if they historically occupied that position or were culturally assumed to be
innately built for the role. The nursing profession within the United States is a salient instance of this
phenomena, as the industry is fairly dominated by women at a 9.5 to 1 ratio.17 Attempts to explain
this divide typically refer to the culturally imposed maternalistic nature of the nursing profession,
implying that women are more suited for the position than men who are seen to lack these qualities.
Without going into detail regarding the exceptionally flawed detailed in this logic, the argument does
serve to bolster Figart & Mutari’s claim that occupational discrimination could have its roots in
something beyond a desire for distance between two parties.
Another criticism of Becker lies in his characterization of employers, and subsequently
corporations, as non-profit maximizing. Specifically, the problem in reimagining corporations in
such a regard places a variable beyond profit into a corporation’s operational scheme. Addressing
this dilemma, Kenneth J. Arrow asks, “If employers have one variable other than their profit
maximads, why not others?”18 While not violating rationale choice theory, Arrow contends that
Becker confounds it by adding more variables to consider in understanding corporations’
motivations.19 On its surface, Arrow’s argument is valid in that neoclassical economics treats firms
as profit-maximizing. However, to assume that employers and their respective corporations act with
perfect cohesion of values in their hiring criteria is dubious at best. Moreover, this assumption would
preclude the possibility of prejudiced hiring managers exercising their discriminatory preferences if
doing so would go against the preferences of those who outrank them in their firm. Even if
discrimination was uniformly distributed among the executives at a corporation and those who make
the individual hiring decisions, their felt disutility would hardly matter to the stockholders since they
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are presumably less concerned with no-profit maximizing related variables. This observation informs
Arrow’s, and many others’, greater issue with Becker’s theory. Under the assumption of perfect
competition as well as a variable distribution of prejudice among employers, non-discriminatory
firms would be expected to push out their discriminatory competitors as the latter firm operates with
higher costs. Yet, as Becker himself claimed 11 years after his initial publication, this outcome has
not been realized; he states, “Unfortunately, this has not yet taken place; discrimination exists, and
at times even flourishes, in competitive economies.”20
In addition to its complications in the long-run, Becker’s initial assumptions of perfectly
substitutable labor between black and white workers, along with his assumption of perfect
information, have garnered a great degree of criticism. Under Becker’s theory, black and white
workers have entirely equal productive capacities, which thus renders any wage differential between
the two groups unproductive. By doing so, Becker reduces any discussion of the supply side to a
point beyond the scope of his discussion of discrimination. This, in essence, ignores the potential for
skill differences between black and white workers, which in turn could be explained by pre-market
discrimination in access to and quality of education between the two groups. While this type of
discrimination occurring outside of the labor market is difficult to measure, ignoring it necessarily
creates a warped understanding of employer discrimination in the real world, where such differences
are apparent. Opportunities for higher learning within the United States and in many countries abroad
have been notoriously restricted to certain groups depending on their historical treatment. Moreover,
as a result of segregation within the United States, the quality of education was and, in some cases
remains to be, dependent on an individual’s access to a well-funded schooling district. Historically,
in the United States, many black and Latino individuals are relegated to lower income communities,
which often results in underfunded schools. Furthermore, the assumption of perfect information
assumes that employers are fully aware of this unrealistic equality in productive capacity among the
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varying races, and, because of their racial predilections, are compelled to discriminate despite the
supposed long-run costs of doing so. Perhaps some employers do not discriminate on the basis of
wantonly exacting their prejudice against a particular race, but are instead compelled to do so because
they legitimately believe there to be a productive difference between the two groups despite there
being none. This opens up the discussion to the topic of statistical discrimination, wherein ignorance
could perhaps be more directly to blame for wage differentials and occupational segregation rather
than disutility. Realistically, however, the differences in productive capacity could also be a result
of social stratification that have made access to resources such as education excessively difficult for
marginalized communities in the United States. Social stratification as well as exclusion speak to the
nature of both the skill disparities as well as the disproportionate rates of return on human capital
that have been observed between marginalized communities and their socio-politically dominant
counterparts in many nations.
In any case, Becker’s unrealistic assumptions and ideal long-run predictions indicate that he
was less concerned with the question of why discrimination exists and was more focused on how it
is both manifested within and resolved by a capitalist system. As Mats Lundahl & Eskil Wadensjo
(2015) state on the topic of Becker’s theory, “increased competition works against employer
discrimination. If the aim is to decrease discrimination, attempts should be made to increase
competition in different markets.”21 Becker does not distinguish between employer prejudice and
discrimination, which obfuscates the reality that employers do not necessarily act on their racial
attitudes in their hiring or wage-setting decisions. In Becker’s mind, a discriminatory employer is
only characterized as such if they experience a disutility that factors into their utility maximizing
function. Yet, this disqualifies as discriminatory those employers who either do not feel a disutility
form working in close proximity with or are begrudgingly compelled to hire black individuals. In
ignoring these potential areas of discrimination, the non-monetary modes of prejudice against black
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workers are ignored within the workplace. Becker’s uniform view of racial preferences and the
manner through which they are enforced are severely limiting as Ikeda (2017) points out, stating, “
. . . for many people in real life it does matter, a lot, if your employer is racist but does not choose to
discriminate in terms of wages or in a way that an outside observer could easily detect . . because
economically impactful things, such as whether her relationships with suppliers, employees, and
customers will flourish over time, may depend on it.”22 The larger critique Ikeda (2017) refers to
against Becker’s theory is its reliance on this neoclassical understanding of choice, which, from his
perspective, constrains the discussion of employer discrimination such that both causality and impact
are not fully addressed. Neoclassical choice is predicated on utility-maximization, which employers
adhere to fully within the standard models. An employer’s indifference curve is tangent to their
budget constraint such that it meets their ideal combination of black and white workers, which,
according to both Becker and Arrow, varies based on the employer’s discrimination coefficient.
Moreover, in a competitive market with varying indifference curves and ideal combinations, the ratio
of black to white workers varies from employer to employer. Ikeda (2017) takes issue with the notion
that employers “choose” to discriminate, articulating that preferences and the compulsion to act on
them are treated as equal in neoclassical theory.23 “Choosing” to discriminate implies that there is
some alternative path of action an employer can take other than the utility-maximizing option, which,
under neoclassical theory, the employer will never elect to choose. Ikeda suggests that a definition
of choice that is more grounded in the “real world” could remedy some of the problems that have
arisen in Becker’s work.
While Becker’s theory of employer discrimination is not without flaws, it has provided many
economists with an immensely valuable starting point on where and how one observes discrimination
in the labor market. Cross-racial aversion may not explain the entirety of occupational segregation
and wage differentials observed in both the United States and abroad, but many argue that it remains
22
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a factor nonetheless. Additionally, Kofi & Guryan (2008) put many of Becker’s assumptions and
predictions to the test, and found that many of them hold up. Namely, the idea that the racial wage
gap can be attributed more so to the marginal discriminator than the average level of prejudice, that
the ratio of the black to white labor force is negatively correlated to wages, and that concentration of
discriminatory preferences matter far more in the right end of the distribution than the left.24
Regardless, many of the criticisms of Becker’s underlying methodology remain valid, and have
spurred new theories of understanding discrimination as a result.
1.4 Outside the Neoclassical Paradigm
Beyond his own work, Becker has spurred discussions and new theories in the economics
world on the proper way to approach labor market discrimination. While the topic has been discussed
and tested frequently throughout the years, most economists who attempt to formulate their own
approach refer to Becker, with their sentiments regarding his work ranging from critical to
supportive. Naturally, as the literature base has expanded in both authorship and volume, the
diversity of approaches has grown in turn. Economists have utilized correspondence studies,
extensive regression analyses, surveys and much more to make cases for or against labor market
discrimination with varying degrees of success. This section will begin with a critical discussion of
neoclassical economics’ approach to discrimination, weighing its strengths against its weaknesses
while also observing alternative methods. It will argue that analyzing wage-differentials through
regression analysis and occupational discrimination through correspondence studies are beneficial
means of assessing the magnitude of labor market discrimination. While these methods cannot
produce outcomes that definitively prove the existence of employer discrimination in the mold that
Becker and others have put forth, their results can offer significant insight into the phenomena’s
severity.
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Before discussing the validity of economics in understanding discrimination, it is crucial to
delve into the discipline’s shortcomings. Neoclassical economics tends to characterize human
behavior, on both the group and individual level, as utility maximizing. Consumption and production
decisions are rooted in marginal benefit versus marginal cost, the former defined by an essentialized
understanding of human psychology and the latter determined by markets that are abstracted beyond
an individual’s control. Preferences and their subsequent variability among individuals are treated
with a myopic uniformity, which facilitates the production of a neoclassical understanding of
markets and their agents as rational as they place utility above all else. This framework leaves little
room for moral and sociopolitical differences or for desires that go beyond this conception of
rationality offered by the neoclassical paradigm. These assumptions are not necessarily formed by a
malice against the differences apparent among humans; rather, they are constructed out of a desire
for convenience. To create a scale that demarcates individual preferences such that it accounts for
the manifold differences among humanity would be an exercise in futility. Thus the tradeoff between
granular accuracy and total authenticity is made. As Cain (1986) states, “The economists treatment
of tastes is, however, circumscribed. Tastes are fundamentally taken as given, and explaining their
sources or how they may be changed tends to be left to the other social sciences. Instead, the
economist’s main objective is to determine certain behavioral outcomes that are the consequences
of these tastes – specifically, the disparities in employment, wages, and so on.”25 This brand of
exceptionalism proves problematic for economists tasked with rationalizing discrimination within
the labor market. For those like Becker & Arrow, who ascribe to the neoclassical paradigm,
discrimination can be explained through subtle deviations in the utility-maximizing function that
accommodate these prejudicial preferences insofar as they fit within their understanding of market
forces. Wage differentials would persist in the short-run, but given a competitive market, perfect
information, and a seemingly arcane distribution of prejudice among employers, they would be
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eradicated in the long-run. The supply-side is largely ignored as pre-market differences among
individuals is not seen as relevant to their discussion because this definition of discrimination would
not necessarily persist if marginalized peoples were disproportionately unqualified.
In ignoring the potential discrimination that occurs outside the labor market, neoclassical
economists analyzing wage differentials can misrepresent the influence that statistical
discrimination, social stratification or occupational segregation has on producing circumstances
surrounding a labor market affected by inequality. Two individuals, one belonging to a marginalized
group and the other a dominant one, that differ in their productive capacities, and are subsequently
compensated unequally, are not necessarily treated differently because of some inherent inferiority
between them. Yet, if one were to apply the neoclassical understanding of discrimination bereft of
sociopolitical awareness, this difference would be anomalous to the model and could only logically
be explained by a difference in productivity. Does this mean that employers are justified in unequally
compensating their marginalized employees? Ostensibly, their decision would be valid and not
constitute discrimination according to the neoclassical paradigm. This correlation between
productive capacity and justified compensation becomes problematic when it is deconstructed.
Perhaps this employer chose to set the wage lower for their marginalized employee because of
perceived difference in productive capacities rather than a concrete one. Edmund S. Phelps (1972)
explores this link between employers, without a ‘taste’ for discrimination, who utilize race to
extrapolate a candidate’s productive capacity.26 Phelps’ theory of statistical discrimination provides
a constructive lens through which employer behavior can be understood, as underlying assumptions
regarding productivity based on identity have deep roots in the United States as well as in India. Yet,
this focus on the more “liberal” employers, as Phelps constructs them, is intellectually problematic
as it reifies the neoclassical tenant that employers are somewhat justified in their discriminatory
hiring or wage-setting decisions rooted in profit-maximization because they lack an explicitly
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prejudicial attitude. If that were the case, is our employer still discriminatory simply because their
prejudice is more subversive and ingrained in their subconscious than the employer who experiences
a great disutility from hiring marginalized workers? For the marginalized individual, the question is
utterly irrelevant as its answer does nothing to change their material outcome of employment. They
will still be paid less despite having the same credentials, which assumes they are fortunate enough
to obtain the position in the first place. Many economists treat this employer as non-discriminatory
simply because their prejudice is not explicitly stated, but to claim that their ignorance automatically
exempts them from being characterized as discriminatory completely circumvents the reality of
subconscious prejudice. Since this discussion does not concern the psychology of institutional as
well as unconscious racism, sexism and more generally prejudice, it will not be explicitly articulated
here. However, for a comprehensive briefing on these topics, see Baratz & Baratz (1980), Quillian
(2008), and Moule (2009). Understanding prejudice as potentially subconscious, the employer would
still be discriminatory even if they do not face a ‘great disutility’ from working with a marginalized
individual. Thus, attributing wage-differentials to a felt disutility alone would not necessarily capture
these phenomena; however, adding an understanding of statistical discrimination as an explanatory
variable affords greater depth to the discussion. Wage-differentials alone also have the potential to
overlook occupational segregation; perhaps the wage-gap between a minority and dominant group
is non-existent or even extremely pronounced, yet, in either case, it is found that minority group is
incredibly underrepresented in the industry at large. This crowding hypothesis, formalized by
Barbara Bergmann (1974) argues that there are many industries segmented by gender and race,
which adds another dimension to wage-differentials that suggests economists exercise caution before
making sweeping claims regarding the wage-gap.27
Although they do not reveal with complete accuracy the extent of labor market
discrimination, wage-differentials should not be ignored as they point to material differences
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between marginalized and dominant groups that, in conjunction with other modes of analysis,
provide compelling grounds for further investigation of the subject. As has been extensively fleshed
out in the previous sections, wage-differentials alone do not imply discrimination. Rather, unequal
pay for the same or similar positions imply that there exists some sort of discrepancy between two
groups of individuals, which could be explained by perceived production differences, employer taste
for discrimination, concrete production differences, or, as Loury (1999) argues, social exclusion.
There are other methods beyond these that tackle discrimination, but these are the ones most relevant
to this paper’s line of inquiry. Chapter three addresses the specifics of how economists have been
able to prescribe significance to their assessment of wage-differentials. To briefly state its relevance
here, if wage-differentials appear in regressions that are extensively controlled to account for
production differences, in industries that have a relatively qualified labor force that does not deviate
by identity, then it is likely that some level of discrimination is apparent in the wage structure. Since
the supply-side is still, for the most part, ignored here, correspondence studies that focus on the
distribution of jobs among marginalized groups could add value to the outcomes attained by wagedifferentials. For instance, perhaps it is observed that there exists a wage differential between two
marginalized groups, but whether the marginalized group held the same credentials as the dominant
group is uncertain. A study that follows equally qualified individuals of both the marginalized and
dominant group differing only in their identity so as to assess their difficulty in acquiring the same
position could provide further information on the topic. If the marginalized group, despite having
the exact same credentials, is called back less frequently or offered lower wages than their dominant
counterparts, the likelihood of discrimination’s presence in the labor market becomes more
compelling. This hypothetical, as specific as it may seem, speaks to the notion that assessing other
sources of information on the sociopolitical climate that a marginalized group exists within is
important as it provides necessary context. Even if either study finds that difference between the two
groups is directly related to production, this does not necessarily prove that discrimination against
the marginalized group is not actively occurring. While it may speak to the discrimination outside
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the labor market, it is still worthwhile to know so that proper praxis can be developed to deal with
the issue. Loury (1999), an economist from Boston University, contends,
There is, of course, a long history of justified concerned that an approach to the problem of
group inequality that focuses less on employer discrimination and more on skills differences
could foster dangerous stereotypes, and undermine arguments for policies to narrow the racial
wage gap. In the decade after the enactment of US anti-discrimination laws, researchers like
Wilson (1978) who began to find evidence of a decline in labor market discrimination were
sometimes criticized for giving aid and comfort to political conservatives. However, this
reaction accepts the implicit normative assumption that racial inequality based on skill
disparities is not as important a moral problem, warranting as vigorous a corrective
intervention, as inequality based on wage discrimination in the labor market. That assumption
is not compelling. It should be challenged.28

While Loury takes a sharply critical standpoint on the role of economics in discriminatory studies,
his notion that wage-differentials have their limits as well as their importance stands to reason. The
racial wage gap itself should not be the only factor considered by policy makers in their
deliberations because, as chapter three will address, it is a combination of discrimination, social
stratification, skill differences and growing anti-caste sentiment that explain wage-differentials at
least within the context of India. With Loury’s criticism in mind, we proceed to a discussion of
how to interpret caste-based discrimination as it pertains to India through the theory discussed
above, which is focused on the black-white relationship within the United States.
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Chapter Two: Discriminatory Economic Theory in the Caste Context
2.1 The Binary Nature of Caste Oppression
Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar, one of India’s earliest and foremost proponents for caste equality,
once stated, “We must stand on our own feet and fight as best we can for our rights. So carry on your
agitation and organize your forces. Power and prestige will come to you through struggle.” Through
what can only be categorized as in indefatigable resolve, Ambedkar fought to mobilize India’s
backwards castes to rise against an antiquated status quo that had, for generations, relegated them to
the bottom rung of a hierarchy characterized by sociopolitical and economic disenfranchisement. As
is the case in many nations whose population is partially comprised by a historically marginalized
group, India’s backward and scheduled caste populations continues to struggle in their goal to
achieve equality. Only recently within the past century have these low caste communities managed
to gain political clout sufficient enough to pressure the Indian government into passing legislation in
deference to their struggle.
The discourse surrounding caste frames this resistance in an all-too familiar binary structure:
black or white, man or woman, Dalit or Brahmin. Indeed, Ambedkar’s inspiring sentiments feature
rhetoric that is deeply reminiscent of Dr. Martin Luther King’s speeches or Simone de Beauvoir’s
writings. Each of these figures sought to achieve equality for their respectively marginalized groups,
and their similarities reveal a commonality in the nature of identity-based discrimination that allows
for comparison. For black individuals in the United States and in many majority white nations, multifaceted identities have ramifications on their sociopolitical and material existence as a result of
rampant discrimination, both past and present. Similarly, women, throughout the world and frankly
for millennia, have suffered due to their identity and epochs of unrelenting misogyny. Further
confounding these groups’ marginalization are their myriad intersections and variances of identity,
each of which warrants their own discourse and analysis. Caste relations can be thought of in a
similar fashion to these other identity arrangements. Where these group struggles differ in historical
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context, severity, and superficial identity traits, they find common ground in the binary nature of
their oppression and its manifestations into their material lives.
Commonalties in the nature of discrimination across identity categories has allowed for
economists to take theory applicable to a particular group and adapt it to explore the nature and
reality of a differing group’s struggle. This chapter will delve into the context of discriminatory
economic theory, written in large part by economists concerned with either the relationship of black
to white individuals or that of women and men, as it pertains to and has been applied to caste relations
in India. It will begin with a critical analysis of ‘taste-based’ discrimination as it relates to forward
and backward castes, discussing the extent to which it can reasonably be attributed to employer
discrimination in India. Statistical discrimination will be explored to the same ends as the discussion
on taste-based discrimination. Finally, it will conclude with an analysis of social exclusion as a
prominent contributory factor in Dalit marginalization and unequal treatment both within and outside
of the labor market. Ultimately, this chapter will contend that the current state of employer labormarket discrimination against backwards castes is best analyzed by weighing the results produced
by each of these frameworks in conjunction with one another. This chapter will also take a critical
stance against neoclassical economic theory in its understanding of discrimination as a labor market
phenomenon, and will contend that in-market discrimination can also be attributed to the persistence
of a social order that is propagated, perhaps even overtly exacerbated, by the competitive market.
Thus, this chapter’s end-goal is to show how applying the various theories regarding discriminatory
economics to the relationship between backwards and forward castes can elucidate their
disenfranchisement.
2.2 ‘Taste-based’ Discrimination’s Questionable Relevance to the Caste Context
The theory of ‘taste-based’ discrimination as Becker initially framed it neither accurately
reflects the nature of caste-based employer discrimination nor does it offer a realistic prediction for
the Indian labor market in the long run. There are those who have utilized Becker’s framework to
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argue against the need for anti-discriminatory legislation and instead for the propagation of policy
that emboldens a competitive market.29 Since taste-based models predict the eradication of
discrimination in the long-run under perfection competition, it is obvious why there are those who
believe the best recourse against labor market inequalities is to encourage a free market unperturbed
by anti-discriminatory legislation. However, to build from the discussion on Becker in chapter one,
the likelihood of the competitive market to solve discrimination alone is small. India has been, in
large part, a capitalist nation with an open economy akin to the United States for well over a century.
One would expect, according to those who laud the competitive market’s ability to erode employer
discrimination, that, at the very least, the wage-gap between Dalits and FCs would be on a steadily
downward trend as the economy becomes more liberal over time. Yet, this is not the case in many
sectors of the Indian labor market; rather, the rate at which the wage gap changes is erratic, even
increasing in the past few years. Moreover, if a competitive market were to be lowering these wage
gaps and contributing to the destruction of occupational ‘glass ceilings’, one would expect there to
be a generous increase consumption occurring among the backwards castes as a result of their
allegedly greater income. Again, this is not the case. NSSO data indicates that from 1999 to 2012,
the expenditure gap between Dalit and upper caste households decreased by just 1% in rural areas
and 5% in Urban areas. Given that the rural expenditure gap between 1999-2000 was a staggering
38% and the corresponding gap in urban areas was 65%, the magnitude of this decrease does not
indicate any significant change to Dalit’s overall economic position.30 Additionally, those who
support the competitive market framework such that they believe discriminatory firms would be
pushed out due to the high cost of exercising one’s taste cite the recent rise in Dalit millionaires as
evidence of this change.31 However, while there has been a rise in Dalit millionaires and
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entrepreneurs over the past decade, the caste’s overall representation as owners or proprietors of
these firms is significantly small.32
In the cases of the Indian rural informal & urban formal labor markets in particular,
characterizing employers who exercise their taste for discrimination as costly contributes to the
erroneous notion that upper castes do not benefit from the readily exploitable source of labor that
Dalits are compelled to offer. Firstly, it is important to understand that Dalits have been historically
relegated to jobs that are deemed sacrilegious or unholy, and, in many rural regions of India, these
implied hierarchical organizations have persisted with varying degrees of severity. 33 Given the
increased representation of Dalits in non-caste related industries that has occurred over the past fifty
years or so, one can state that the occupational structure implied by the caste-system has moved away
from its traditional rigidity. However, to then make the claim that the occupational structure of
industries that require some degree of higher education have transformed into egalitarian spaces open
too all regardless of caste identity would be to ignore reality. Many Dalits, either by virtue of their
inability to access the means to afford them a better job or from experiencing pressure from uppercaste individuals to remain in their lowly position, still occupy the least paying and socially abhorrent
jobs available. In recent years, stories have emerged of Dalits being subjected to extreme violence
for attempting to break their caste roles in even the most miniscule of manners. 34 Clearly, since no
forward caste wants to do the work of a Dalit, they also assume that their low caste status implies a
certain responsibility and aptitude for that particular line of work. This manifests itself in difficulty
attaining the same wage as their upper cast counter parts in lines of work that are either traditionally
consigned to FCs or are thought of as inappropriate for Dalits due to their low position in society. In
any case, offering Dalits lesser wages proportional to the FCs, discriminatory employers are
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experiencing the short-run benefit implied by Becker’s theory of taste-based discrimination without
incurring the long-run ramifications of being outcompeted by non-discriminatory firms.
2.3 Enduring Social Stratification: Contextualizing the Caste System
To better understand how caste has persisted as a dominant identity category among Indians,
it is crucial to discuss the imbalanced power dynamics and social stratification the has plagued the
nation for centuries. Firstly, while there are striking similarities, the Indian caste system is unique
from marginalization as it is discussed in the context of black and white individuals in the United
States. There is an explicitly defined hierarchy to caste codified in religious and cultural texts that
have been in popular circulation throughout India for centuries.35 One is born into their caste and is
subjected to the burdens or luxuries circumscribed on them through the roles defined by this
hierarchy. In the past, caste hierarchy was far more overt, pervasive, and enforced than it is today in
that the occupational structure outlined by various cultural and religious bodies of work was rarely
defied. In this regard, caste does not limit all Indians to an explicitly defined line of work or political
representation to the degree it did so in the past. By law, it is illegal to discriminate on the basis of
caste, and institutions of higher education as well as certain industries that were at one point
exclusive to FCs are seeing higher representations of low caste groups than before. Yet, while the
occupational structure itself has more or less broken down in recent times or is at least less relevant,
low caste representation in white collar formal jobs is significantly lower than their forward caste
counterparts. Data from the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes survey
conducted in 1996 indicates that SCs comprised 10% of the labor force among white collar
professions, while Brahmins, Rajputs, and “other upper castes” accounts for, respectively, 34.7%,
21.3%, and 21.2% of the same industries.36 In comparison, SCs, OBCs, and STs were far more
represented in the “Artisan/Blue Collar Workers/ Service Provider” positions than their upper caste
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counterparts.37 Moreover, there still exists a correlation between caste and economic inequality that
persists in India despite the system’s growing irrelevancy.38 Das and Dutta (2007), utilizing data
from the 61st round of the NSSO conducted in 2004, find that only 12% of SCs occupy
“professional/technical” professions, 1% occupy “administrative” positions. 4% occupy “sales”
positions, and 42% occupy “Production” and “Farmers, fishermen, etc.” positions.39 When compared
to the general population, these figures indicate a dramatically disproportionate amount of
representation of SCs in white-collar positions. Even in the public sector, where as a result of the
Mandal commission, “mandates 27% representation for OBCs in central government jobs . . . less
than 12 percent of employees of central government ministries, departments and statutory bodies are
from OBCs as on January 1, 2015.”40 Of course, that there are disparities between the groups in
occupational representation does not explicitly speak to the existence of discrimination. Partly to
blame for these disparities is the historical social stratification that pushed many low caste
individuals into low skill jobs. Moreover, empirically established wealth concentrations within the
upper castes likely afforded their members not only the opportunity to pursue higher skilled and
more lucrative positions, but also the expectation to do so.
However, the presence of disproportionate SC and OBC representation in white-collar
industries alludes to a more sinister reality when one considers the prevailing perception of low-caste
individuals throughout India as well as the steadily increasing rate of crimes committed against lowcastes by upper castes over the past two decades. Growing agitation against caste-based
discrimination has been a prominent feature of Dalit politics since the Mandal commission, and has
intensified in present times. While Dalit advocacy has led to progressive reforms and gained traction
within India’s greater political sphere, it has also evoked an anti-low caste sentiment among
numerous upper caste groups throughout the nation. Some upper-castes individuals take issue with

37

Ibid
Sukhadeo Thorat, Graded Caste Inequality and Poverty (2017), 5
39
Maitreyi Bordia Das and Puja Vasudeva Dutta, Does Caste Matter for Wages in the Indian Labor Market? (2007), 13
40
Siddharth Prabhakar, 20 years after Mandal, less than 12% OBCs in central govt jobs 2015
38

Khanna 32

increased Dalit representation because they believe that their chances of obtaining entry into a
prestigious university or into a white collar industry are fairly lowered. More troubling are the vast
amounts of non-Dalit individuals in areas such as Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi and Mumbai who
still actively practice untouchability despite its explicit illegality. Coffey et. al (2018) found that in
Rajasthan and rural Uttar Pradesh, which have a combined population of roughly 200 million
individuals, over half non-Dalit Hindu households practice untouchability as of 2011.41 This study
utilized survey responses to questions such as “Would there be a problem if someone who is from a
Scheduled Caste entered your kitchen or used your utensils?”, and “Do you yourself practice
untouchability?” that were featured in the IHDS 2011 survey.42. Historically, because low-caste
individuals held occupations widely perceived to be dirty and sacrilegious, upper castes went to great
extents to avoid interacting with them. Thus, the question regarding scheduled caste interactions with
non-Dalit’s utensils was intended to reveal the degree to which that belief persisted. The amount of
“yes” responses from Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, in both rural and urban environments, ranged
from 48% to 66% of the individuals surveyed. 43 In Delhi and Mumbai respectively, 39% and 21%
of respondents answered “yes” to one of these questions. These results correlate well with the notion
that less urban environments are more likely to see the existence of caste-based discrimination than
others. On the topic of supporting a law that forbids high and low caste inter-marriage, this study
finds that, “the proportion of non-Dalit adults who support such a law ranges from 60% in rural
Rajasthan to about 40% in Delhi.”44 Marriage among castes in India was expressly forbidden in the
past, and the desire to maintain it modern times vis-a-via legislation speaks to a non-Dalit motivation
to maintain the caste distinctions that have afforded many of them a favorable position in Indian
society.45 The results from this study aid our analysis of labor market discrimination in that lends
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credence to the notion that a lack of Dalit representation in white-collar fields could feasibly be a
result of the persistence of anti-low caste sentiment held by, in some cases, over half of the
population of large Indian states.46 Rather than pointing to the existence of discrimination existing
within the labor market exclusively, it can be inferred from this study that caste system’s overarching
social order has yet to fully dissipate.
2.4 Neoclassical Theoretic Conflicts & Discrepancies observed in Caste Relations
Becker, Bergmann, and Phelps produce models that frame income inequality or
underrepresentation as a labor market phenomenon that cannot last in the long-run; however, it
appears that caste values persist beyond this context. These models treat the decision to discriminate
as predicated on whether it is profitable to do so, yet, as the evidence above indicates, there could be
a larger set of out-market circumstances to blame that are effectively ignored through these
neoclassical frameworks. Discussions of in-market inequality as temporal, isolated or resulting from
human capital variances between groups then force the conclusion that remediating the wage gap or
underrepresentation in the labor market can be solved by making a marginalized group more
profitable through affirmative action initiatives that reduce skill differences and promote equal
access to resources. At least within India, this praxis is demonstrably insufficient. These policies do
not address the anti-low caste sentiments entrenched in many upper caste enclaves, whose
discriminatory hiring practices do not necessarily align with increasing profit margins as much as
they are rooted in a desire to the maintain the caste distinctions that afford them unfettered
socioeconomic mobility. Thus, a more solid theoretical approach to economic discrimination must
not be limited to the labor market so as to not obfuscate the role that social stratification and historic
exclusion has played in spurring in-market inequality. To better understand the scheduled caste
position within a broader context, consider the following: In 2013, SCs had a wealth share of 7%,
which, compared to their population share of 18%, indicates that the wealth inequality between the
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castes remains somewhat consistent with historical standards. By contrast, high castes, who hold a
population share of 21%, own roughly 45% of India’s wealth. OBCs own 31%, which is 5% lower
than their population share.47 The ownership of wealth generating resources such as land, buildings,
and financial assets are largely controlled by the upper castes. Land accounts for 56% of the total
wealth in India, SCs control 7.3% of that wealth, while the upper castes account for 41.2%.48 Upper
castes own 53.1% of the wealth derived from buildings, with SCs accounting for 7.2% and OBCs
23.7%. The ownership of financial assets, in the same vein, is primarily in the hand of the upper
castes, who control 48.5% of the wealth earned from these assets, while SCs control 8.7% and OBCs
26.3%. Upper caste population shares are, in all these instances, dramatically lower than their wealth
ownership, while SC and OBC population shares are generally higher than their wealth share. 49 In
other words, there is a massive concentration of ownership of productive assets to the historically
privileged upper castes. Beyond ownership, gaps in educational attainment, occupations, income,
and access to public resources are also readily apparent between SC/OBCs and the upper-castes.
Literacy rates among the scheduled castes were, as of 2011, 56.50% for females and 75.20% for
males.50 By contrast, India’s overall literacy rate, including all castes, was 65.46% for females and
82.14% for males in 2011.51 Despite the lower rates among SCs, the gap has been closing over the
past decade, which speaks, in part, to the success of affirmative action programs that have aimed to
increase educational attainment among the low-castes. Indeed, SC representation across all levels of
education has increased, by varying degrees depending on the type of schooling, alongside this
increase in literacy rates.52 Moreover income gaps, discussed in chapter three, are apparent between
the castes but are also less extreme than they have been in the past few decades. Additionally, in the
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past, rates of Dalit concentrations in underdeveloped villages remain disproportionate to the upper
castes but have also been found to decrease over time.53
So, since the gaps in quality of life are decreasing over time as the gap in out-market
characteristics are beginning to converge, does this indicate that labor market inequalities are
primarily a result of material differences between the castes, and that caste values are losing salience
throughout India? If social discrimination were to be viewed in the neoclassical context, perhaps this
would be the case. However, it has been established that caste values remain prevalent in many
regions of India and that the caste distinctions themselves provide an out-market benefit for the
privileged group that incentivize a discriminatory labor market. Further damning is the fact that
violent crime against scheduled castes has increased over the past few decades, which some
researchers have found to be in response to the very fact that these caste gaps are converging. In
other words, as low caste groups have begun to educate themselves at greater rates, hold positions
that they traditionally were excluded from, move out of villages they historically inhabited, there has
been a negative feedback effect that can be observed through the rate of crimes against them rising.
These facts call into question the notion that statistical discrimination, the lack of perfect
information, is to blame for the persistence of wage gaps or occupational segregation between the
castes. In many cases, it is not simply the differences in characteristics that is to blame for
discrimination, it is instead the explicit privileged group desire to maintain distance from the low
caste because integration threatens favorable caste distinctions.
Statistical discrimination constructs employers as utilizing group identity markers, in lieu of
perfect information, as a “signal that allows them to improve their predictions of a prospective
candidate’s ability to perform.”54 Darity & Mason (1998) point out that the problem with this mode
of analysis is that it does not explain why discrimination seems to be apparent in the long-run. If the
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characteristic differences between groups were based on misconceptions alone rather than explicit
discriminatory preferences, employers “should learn that their beliefs are mistaken.”55 Conversely,
if those differences are found to be real, then in a world with anti-discrimination laws in place,
employers would not need an additional identity signal to accurately predict “the future performance
of potential employees.”56 Darity & Mason’s criticisms stated above speak to the larger issue in
statistical discrimination being the tacit assumption that human capital deficiencies, both real and
perceived, occurring in the pre-market are to blame for wage differentials or occupational
segregation throughout the economy. This stance further implies that market processes (hiring
patterns, wage setting, productivity predictions etc.) are not responsible in “producing differential
outcomes.”57 They are instead framed as a utility-maximizing response to human capital deficiencies
that supposedly corrects itself in the long-run if the conditions for closing the skill gap are met.
Darity & Mason undercut this argument by pointing to the growth in Southern manufacturing
industry in the United States prior to 1965 having little to no effect on the black labor market position
despite there being no law prohibiting black employment in the textiles industry except in South
Carolina. This industry-specific prejudice was not codified explicitly into law, yet the proportion of
black workers in the textiles industry was small until the 1964 Civil Rights Act hindered the ability
of racist employers to employ their “informally enforced codes” and “private practices.”58 In this
case, the unfavorable economic position of blacks was not necessarily or solely predicated on human
capital deficiencies occurring outside the labor market. Rather, the prejudicial environment, existing
and enforced outside legal institutions, directly contributed to their labor market representation,
which itself was facilitated by the very market pressures that neoclassical economists view as bearing
no culpability in this regard. This market, unfettered by explicit legal institutions until 1964, which
is proposed to act in this utility-maximizing basis, consistently discriminated against black
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individuals for decades despite there being a concurrent decrease in the human capital gaps over the
same period. This particular example offers a useful parallel in understanding the Dalit predicament;
wherein their increasing literacy rates, educational attainment, and so on has not necessarily
manifested in their increased representation in white-collar industries or their realization of equal
compensation. In the case of caste, the informally enforced codes and social networks are arguably
just as pervasive and observable within the labor market as they are outside of it. As Thorat &
Newman (2007) state, “A community-based system of enforcement regulates caste privileges by
means of social ostracism, violence, and economic penalties that find their justification in elements
of Hindu religion.”59 In this regard, it is unlikely that upper caste employers are discriminating
against the SCs and OBCs because they perceive there to be some sort of human capital deficiency
to justify their decision. The stronger argument to be made is that these employers choose not to hire
low-caste individuals or offer them lower wages because doing so maintains caste distinctions within
the labor market that are themselves a reflection of caste values outside of the market.
Ultimately, sections 2.1 – 2.4 have attempted to delineate the problems with neoclassical
economics’ proposed understanding of discrimination as aberrant to the operations of a competitive
market, with India’s current issues revolving around caste marginalization serving as an example of
these shortcomings. Neoclassical economics frames the competitive market in a strangely egalitarian
manner in the sense that it values productivity and utility above all else, where issues of
discrimination must be based on perceptions of human capital deficiencies that resolve in the longrun. This framing implies that the market does not sustain discrimination; rather, “discrimination
sustains itself against the pressures of a competitive market.”60 If an employer discriminates, there
must be some profit-oriented aspect to their decision; be it a result of imperfect information,
legitimate characteristic differences, a ‘taste for discrimination’ or any other factor as long as it aligns
with the notion that the competitive market is not to blame for discrimination. If anything, the
59
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competitive market is supposed to naturally oust observed instances of discrimination in the long run
primarily because neoclassical economics recognizes that the behavior as unproductive and nonutility maximizing. Perhaps economists reach these conclusions because they treat their inputs as
perfectly substitutable, with employers acting on the basis of marginal profit and cost, all within a
competitive market framework that constructs the extraction of productivity as the impetus for hiring
decisions. Yet, what is readily apparent when one observes India’s competitive market, is that human
capital deficiencies, while they exist between caste groups, are not the sole cause for their
underrepresentation in white collar industries. SC and OBCs’ poor socioeconomic positionality is in
part a result of competitive market forces that have allowed for the distribution of upper castes into
the highest paying white collar jobs across the Indian labor markets to persist at the detriment of SCs
and OBCs, who are relegated to the bottom rung of employment opportunities. Potentially as a result,
wealth inequality persists among the SCs and OBCs. The caste system’s social order has yet to
dissipate from the collective Indian conscious, and the competitive market has, instead of erasing
inequality, allowed for upper-caste enclaves to enact their discriminatory sentiments within the labor
market unabated by legal institutions. Before proceeding to section 2.5, which discusses social
exclusion as both a motivator and cause for discrimination, it is important to note that the preceding
discussion of neoclassical economics should not diminish the benefits that come with increasing
access to education and quality of life for SCs and OBCs. With better access to education in India,
many SCs and OBCs have become more aware of the injustices committed against them over the
past few decades, and have thus engaged in the political advocacy that has brought to light the
persistence of caste values within India’s social organization. What these sections simply tried to
illuminate is these changes in the material lives of SCs and OBCs are not enough to address the
widespread caste sentiments that still thrive throughout India, which exist both within and outside of
the competitive market. This should serve both as the foundation for policy that targets SC and OBC
treatment in Indian society rather than just their material position, as well as a discussion on why
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competitive market forces alone are not enough to resolve labor market inequalities, partly because
they allow for such discriminatory practices to continue.
2.5 The Necessity to Address Social Exclusion
Social networks are a particularly insidious remnant of the caste system that assists this
paper’s attempt to understand the persistence of economic inequality between the castes. Rather than
discrimination functioning as a tool of utility-maximization within the labor market, perhaps it
operates through external social networks, with upper caste individuals whose favorable positionality
within the caste hierarchy have compelled them to maintain the status quo. This viewpoint is
interesting for a variety of reasons. It insinuates that perhaps the underrepresentation and unequal
payment of SCs and OBCs in certain industries within labor market results from their systematic
restriction of access to resources that would increase their productive capacities. Moreover, the
motivation for limiting these access to resources are closely tied to a desire to maintain distance
between the castes regardless of the context. In the context of India, where untouchability has yet to
be forgotten entirely, this narrative of social exclusion is valid to a certain degree. 61 To this point,
Thorat (2008) refers to the Action Aid (2000) study on untouchables in rural India where it was
found that 36% of the 555 villages across 11 states exhibited instances of SCs being denied
employment on the basis of their caste. Thorat states, “Belief in the notions of purity and pollution
also affected the hiring of the SC wage labourers in housing construction—in about one-third of the
villages, they were excluded from employment for the construction of houses.”62 A similar study,
(Shah, Mander, Thorat, Desphande and Baviskar, 2006) found that in a study of 565 villages across
11 states, 38% of government schools force Dalit children to sit separately during lunch from the
rest of their peers, with 20% of government schools forbidding them to even drink from the same
water fountain.63 This study is rife with staggering figures; one third of health workers refusing “to
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visit Dalit homes”, half of the Dalits surveyed “denied access to common water sources”, 14.4% of
villages surveyed refusing Dalits entry into the panchayat building, and in 12% of villages surveyed,
Dalits were denied the ability to vote.64 The key word in these descriptions is ‘denied’ – it is not
simply that Dalit children were unable to sit with their classmates or drink from the same fountain
because of they did not want to do so, or that they were unable to vote because their proximity to a
booth was particularly large, or that they did not want to be visited by health care workers. They
were denied access to these resources by those in charge of the schools, health care providers,
sanitation companies, and shop keepers explicitly because of their identity. On those grounds, labor
market discrimination could be a result of a desire to maintain the purity of those upper caste
individuals that would be marred by being forced to interact with a Dalit. Thus, in the long-run, there
is no employer incentive within a competitive market for discriminatory preferences to shift in favor
of the marginalized because to do so would be to threaten the established social order. Whether or
not the laborer is qualified in the sense of their productive capacity is more or less irrelevant if the
reason the reason they are restricted access to employment is on the basis that their caste identity
implies a level of religious impurity that bars them from entry. One could say that this resembles
‘taste-based’ discrimination as it is formulated around the desire to maintain distance between the
marginalized and privileged groups; however, in this case, the desire to maintain distance is
productive outside of the labor market. Discriminatory employers are not losing profit by enacting
their prejudicial beliefs as human capital deficiencies are not the inherent reason as to why low caste
individuals are not being hired. Given that Dalits are routinely denied access to resources that would
allow them to increase their human capital attainment, the fact that SCs/OBCs are, on average, less
likely to be educated or literate than their forward caste counterparts should come as no surprise. 65
Thus, treating SCs/OBCs as perfectly substitutable labor inputs for the statistically better educated
upper castes is not favorable. An alternative is to treat human capital deficiencies as well as labor
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market inequalities as predicated on the system of social exclusion that is likely to discriminate
against low castes despite their qualifications. Considering that the private sector in India is not
subject to any concrete anti-discriminatory caste laws, and that there are also higher instances of
discrimination there than in the public sector, this alternative seems to make more sense.66
Referring to the figures on Dalit treatment in government schools, it is important to also
consider unequal treatment in the pre-market i.e being systematically denied access to myriad
resources ranging from basic ones (water, food, health care) to those that offer or indicate mobility
(voting, education, well-paying jobs). What neoclassical economics fails to account for is that routine
discrimination outside of the labor market could have a feedback effect on the amount of Dalits who
choose not to seek out opportunities that would enfranchise them out of a fear of upper-caste reprisal.
Additionally, Dalits may not seek out those opportunities because their unfavorable group position
within the labor market forces them to believe that trying to get a position outside of their caste
identity would be an exercise in futility.67 The fear of upper caste reprisal is certainly one that is
corroborated by the state of upper-caste crime against Dalits. Sharma (2015) find a particularly
distributing correlation, “that changes in relative economic position between the lower castes and
upper castes are positively correlated with changes in the incidence of crimes, such that a widening
of the gap in expenditures between the lower and upper castes is associated with a decrease in crimes
committed by the upper castes against the SC/STs.”68 These results show that as Dalits gain more
traction in improving their economic situation, seen in this study as an increase in household
expenditures, the number of violent crimes committed against the by upper castes increase. Sharma
(2015) does not suggest that this data should dissuade policy prescriptions that focus on ameliorating
inter-caste inequities, but rather that the larger issue of social perception and agitation against Dalits
must be addressed in tandem. It is difficult to conceptualize how the operations of a competitive
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market unabated by legislation could possibly address such a nuanced social and psychological issue.
Moreover, the Dalit position in Indian society is further proven to be an issue relating to the social
order when one considers that their very access to justice is deterred on the basis of their caste.69
While the previous study is limited to villages in rural India, throughout urban areas the form
of social exclusion still exists in less explicit forms, and has been observed by various studies on job
discrimination. Thorat & Attewell (2007) attempts to dispel the belief that persistent caste
discrimination only exists within rural India, and that the urban, modernized India suffers from these
issues as well. This study, which began in October of 2005 and spanned two years, responded to
hundreds of newspaper advertisements for white collar industries (banking, IT, pharmaceuticals,
accounting, sales, marketing, etc.) with three identical resumes in English, specific to each position,
but differing only in the name of the applicant. All educational qualifications and background
information was exactly the same across the resumes so as to assess the impact of having a low caste
name versus a high caste name in the job process.70 In their analysis of callbacks, they found that
“appropriately qualified applicants with a dalit name had odds of a positive outcome that were 0.67
the odds of an equivalently qualified applicant with a high caste Hindu name.”71 They further
speculate that this overt discrimination so early in the hiring process indicates that equitable hiring
decisions in more advanced stages of the process are “unlikely.”72 Jodhka and Newmann (2007) find
through their interview studies of human resource managers in various industries, that very low caste
members are subjected to a degree of caste based stereotypes that make their ability to find jobs
difficult, with preference being allotted to the middle castes.73 Ultimately, the studies and literature
discussed above point to social exclusion as well as favoritism as the key factor in explaining the
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observed labor market inequalities rather than an explicit in-market discrimination predicated on
productive differences.
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Chapter Three: Wage Differentials
3.1 Wage Discrimination: Definitions & Parameters:
Engaging with the topic of wage-discrimination in the Indian labor market requires
segmentation and clear delineation of categories such as region, occupation, sector and, in this
discussion, caste. Significant opposition to the notion of wage-discrimination exists within the
discourses surrounding caste socioeconomic positionality, many of which feature arguments
predicated on sparse quality of life improvements in disparate regions and without substantial
evidence to justify their sweeping declarations on caste’s eradication as a form of marginalization or
ordering. Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar’s paper, “Capitalism’s Assault on the Indian Caste
System: How Economic Liberalization Spawned Low-Caste Dalit Millionaires” is a prime instance
of this problematic argumentative logic. While Aiyar specifies Uttar Pradesh as his primary region
of focus, his argument against the continuance of caste-based discrimination erroneously relies on
the competitive market’s propensity towards the broader economic liberalization of Dalits. This
paper will delve into Aiyar’s faulty reasoning and the overarching issue of job discrimination that it
entails in later chapters; however, it is important to note certain aspects of his logic before moving
forward with a discussion on wage-based discrimination. At many points in his paper, Aiyar alludes
to caste-based discrimination as a construct of the past undergoing a gradual eradication partly due
to competitive market forces giving way to a subset of Dalit millionaires. On these grounds, Aiyar
argues that this concentration of wealth within the Dalit caste indicated to and contributed towards
their greater social acceptance and economic mobilization on the village level. The notion that wealth
concentration to a select few low-caste individuals somehow alleviates disparate treatment towards
all Dalits is dubious at best. While these competitive market forces coupled with progressive polices
seeking to mitigate caste-based discrimination has lead to certain increases in job access and quality
of life provisions among Dalits, there still exists the force of wage-discrimination that places a ceiling
on the efficacy of these measures intended to foster scheduled caste socioeconomic mobility.
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To understand effectively the socioeconomic landscape wherein India’s scheduled and
backward castes are relegated, it is imperative to understand precisely what constitutes wagediscrimination within the existing economic literature base. For our purposes, we will define wagediscrimination as the unequal labor compensation of those employed in similar or the same positions
or fields based on their individual caste identity. Most articles discussed in this paper utilize a similar
definition when engaging with the topic of wage discrimination, typically controlling for variables
such as gender, residence within the region discussed, social group, and state policies. Individuals
and households are stratified across caste lines either as Scheduled Tribes (ST), Backwards Castes
(Dalits), Other Backward Castes (OBC) and compared to groups of higher castes. Given that
discrimination against the Dalits, OBCs and STs is historically far more pernicious than that faced
by the upper castes, delineating and demarcating discrimination within the upper castes such as
Vaishya, Kshatriya and Brahmin are unnecessary tasks within the context of this discussion.
Data from the National Sample Survey, the Indian Human Development Survey along with
a variety of other region-specific surveys will be featured throughout the literature discussed in this
paper. Both the NSS and the IHDS are household surveys that feature broad sample sizes and collect
data relevant to caste among other pre-market characteristics that range in levels of their impact on
explaining wage differentials. Studies that focus on the IHDS will be incorporated in the ensuing
chapter on occupational discrimination, as they shed more light in that context. We will focus on
discrimination against Dalits as well as OBCs in the regions within these surveys and their
subsequent analyses, compare and contrast results so as to come to the conclusion that despite a
general increase in the overall-wealth and wages throughout the regions discussed, there exists
evidence for caste based wage discrimination in both the Indian urban and labor markets
substantiated by various different models and decomposition methods on similar data sets
3.2 Indicators of Wage Discrimination
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Generally, wage equations consist of characteristics thought to influence an individual’s
earning propensity such as education, age, sector, location, formality of employment, and experience
level.74 Empirically, these are factors employers consider during the hiring process when evaluating
a candidate to ascertain their productive capacity. In a profit-maximizing context, which we assume
to be the prevailing mentality of firms we analyze and is not inherently discriminatory, employers
have a hierarchical understanding of these characteristics and valuate their candidates based on what
they believe to be an ideal combination of these factors. For instance, it can be reasonably assumed
that a profit-maximizing steel manufacturer would want employees with some vocational training in
the industry, experience within other plants so as to minimize costs as well mitigate the risk of an
employee causing damage to machinery or other workers, and the capacity to work full-time. While
these are all reasonable employer expectations, one can begin to establish discriminatory tendencies
within firm behavior if, after regressing along these characteristics to determine the greatest
influence on the log monthly wage, one finds that adding and regressing upon group identity in the
equation yields significance when contrasted to other explanatory variables.75 In the case of this
fictitious steel manufacturer, if one regresses upon the monthly wages of a large sample size of
workers at this plant and find that wage is primarily based on experience, but upon addition of and
regression upon a male-female group identity reveals that male workers on average are, when
controlling for other characteristics, paid higher than their female counterparts, the possibility of
discrimination as an explanatory factor increases in likelihood. However, at this point in the steel
manufacturer’s scenario, discrimination is not yet proven as this wage equation assumes a uniform
wage structure among all group identities. Implied within this assumption is that the labor market
values all factors of productivity in the same manner for all the group identities in question, which
is, according to Deshpande, “untenable in the presence of discrimination.76” Deshpande continues,
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“The gap could be due to differences in education or skill levels or simply due to the fact that groups
might be concentrated in different segments of the occupational spectrum . . . thus, it is necessary to
separate the effects of the differential educational or skill levels from the discriminatory component,
which could be, of course, zero.77” Applying this logic to the steel manufacturer scenario, perhaps
the difference between male and female worker compensation could be attributed to a difference in
their educational and experience levels, thus justifying a decomposition method that would separate
these factors from an unexplained component that one could reasonably attribute to discrimination.
3.3 The Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition Method & The Limits of Regression Analysis
Conveniently, the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method separates the wage-effect of premarket characteristics such as education and experience from a discriminatory ‘unexplained’
variable. As most of the literature base discussing wage-discrimination among caste groups features
this decomposition, it is imperative to make note of the process before delving into a qualitative
analysis of each text.
Firstly, advantages in characteristics such as education, age and experience will be referred
to as endowments, and their effects can be ascertained by regressing upon a standard wage equation
between two or more groups. In a situation where discriminatory practices exist, for instance in the
hypothetical steel manufacturing firm referred to above, the regression results for male and female
wages can be compared to one another, and the difference between the two values will be attributed
to a combination of endowments and, potentially, discrimination. To ascertain that difference, the
Blinder-Oaxaca method would substitute the regression coefficients from the wage equation for
women and place them into the equation for men to see what their yield would be had women been
treated in a similar capacity to men. The difference between this substitution value and the original
wage equation value gives a number that equates to a value that indicate the degree to which
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discrimination exists as it “pairs the estimated rates of return for one group with the characteristics
of the other group.78”
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method is by no means perfect in its assessment of wagediscrimination; however, a few correctional methods have been implemented to account for selection
bias, omitted variable bias, as well as included or diverting variable bias. Moreover, the
decomposition method remains an invaluable tool for garnering at the very least a rough estimation
of the magnitude of wage discrimination between castes. When regressing on wage equations to
account for discrimination along the Blinder-Oaxaca method, the decision to substitute the
coefficients of the marginalized group into the equation of the presumed advantaged group is not
mutually exclusive. In the scenario built around the steel manufacturer, one could easily substitute
the coefficients ascertained for men into the wage equation for women to see to what degree the
former benefit from being treated as the latter as far as their wages are concerned. Deshpande
summarizes a potential correction for this utilized by researches, stating, “Some calculate both
estimates and treat the two as upper and lower bounds, within which the ‘actual’ estimate of
discrimination lies.79” In essence, the upward bound could be considered nepotism whereas the lower
would be discrimination, and within the distance between the two bounds, as Deshpande contends,
would contain an appropriate magnitude for understanding the actual level of discrimination present
in the firm. From my perspective, this seems ideal as the existence of nepotism could at the very
least substantiate the claim that a group of people experience preferential treatment based on group
or identity preferences.
There is still the issue of omitted variable bias, wherein it is possible that the unexplained
gap between wages could be attributed to a variable not considered in the wage equation. In our steel
manufacturing plant, it could be possible that hiring agents happen to value employees who have
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previously worked in competitors’ plants. If most employees who meet that qualification happen to
be male, a regression excluding this control could overestimate the discriminatory coefficient for
women.80 However, the only true correction for this is to be particularly tedious and inclusive with
variables utilized. Moreover, it seems that within the hiring process, pre-market characteristics such
as education and experience are judged fairly consistently by hiring managers. In other words, it
does not seem outlandish to assume that there are certain characteristics that a profit-maximizing
firm, discriminatory or not, consider universally when selecting the ideal candidate for a particular
position. Excessively cautious statisticians that include too many irrelevant non-race controls in their
analysis of disparate treatment could certainly reduce the results’ statistical significance and
precision.81 In a similar vein, it is also possible that controlling for too many non-race factors could
create an included variable bias wherein the effect of discrimination is underestimated as a regression
could mistakenly attribute discriminatory behavior to an unrelated control.82 Unlike the omitted
variable bias that concerns itself with disparate treatment, included variable bias is an issue within
analyzing disparate impact; if the financial records of our steel manufacturer clearly showed that
women were paid a salary distinctly lower than their male counterparts, disparate treatment has
already been established. Including non-race controls that are “Plausible Business-Justified
Influences” could skew analysis of the coefficient produced in that they would attribute
discrimination to factors deemed acceptable to base wage upon.83 Correcting for self-selection is a
less strenuous process; using Heckman’s solution, one would simply calculate a probability of
working in a firm and then transform the outcomes into the wage equation.84 Ultimately, it is apparent
that there exist modes of correcting, albeit imperfectly, for these various biases, all of which are
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reliant on economists’ scrutiny in their control selection and coefficient analysis as well as on the
amount of potentially wage-impacting characteristics within a data set.
Despite the possibility of implementing bias corrections, Richard J. Butler’s critique points
out a fundamental issue with regression analysis’ ability to accurately determine labor-market
discrimination given that the reduced-form equation ascribes demand-side discrimination to that
which is produced on the supply-side.85 Identical levels of pre-market characteristics between two
groups such as education could vary in quality if one group is discriminated against within the
schooling system, thus rendering this marginalized group a smaller productive capacity than their
equally educated outer-group counterparts.86 This situation causes a difference in capital-labor
elasticities between the two groups as one group has a higher return on a productive, profitdetermining characteristic than the other. Suppose that both women and men are more likely to be
hired by our steel manufacturing plant if they attend and perform well in a vocational program that
provides them with skills they need to increase their productivity on the plant floor. If instructors
within that vocational program happen to favor men over women believing in a higher potential
productive capacity in the former than the latter, and this misogynist attitude skews the distribution
of training quality and performance judgement, women who graduate the program would be at a
disadvantage given that they were denied access to a fair and balanced education. An employer in
this perfectly competitive, profit maximizing firm would likely determine a wage for women based
on their productive capacity, which is assumed to be inherently skewed due to pre-market
discrimination. Subsequent variances in labor demand elasticities would exist; whereas the male
demand curve is likely to remain inelastic due to their higher return on capital, the female demand
curve would be elastic as their pre-market discrimination causes their marginal productivity and thus
return on capital to be less than their male counterpart. Subsequently, under Butler’s logic, the
reduced form wage equations for men and women within this factory would be expected to have
85
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differences in their beta coefficients not attributed to labor-market discrimination; rather, they would
be the results of a profit-maximizing firm compensating their employees based on their marginal
productivities, which differ. Jeremiah Cotton (1988) criticizes Butler’s thinking on the subject of
these coefficients’ existence in the absence of discrimination, stating:
Butler is correct in questioning the comparisons of black and white regression coefficients.
He is not correct, however, to assume that these are the coefficients that would prevail in the
absence of discrimination. For without discrimination we would not expect differences in the
black and white B1 's to persist. Perhaps in the short run just after discrimination has been
eliminated one might observe blacks and whites with different average skills because of
different opportunities in the past, but in the long run as blacks are assured of competing on
equal terms in the same markets as whites the differences in supply characteristics can be
expected to diminish along with differences in the demand for black and white labor. Indeed
it is this very expectation of continuing convergence of black and white skills that is heralded
by the proponents of the vintage hypothesis

The crucial take-away from Cotton’s assertion is that the task of mitigating discriminatory practices
within firms is not a fruitless endeavor in the long-run despite Butler’s apt criticism of regression
analysis’ relative inaccuracy in capturing statistically significant and logically sound coefficient
values. Given that an imbalance in beta coefficient values for two groups differ due in part to
prejudice, it can be assumed that if discrimination were to disappear from the labor market, the shortrun result could be an elimination of disparate treatment as there would be no incentive to
discriminate by identity.87 If, in the absence of discrimination, the reduced form beta coefficients for
men in the steel manufacturing firm were to be higher than their counterparts’, female short-run
supply-side characteristics would certainly remain an issue factoring into their wage differences.
However, from the perspective outlined above, in the long-run, since women would be assured of a
level playing field within their occupation, their demand and subsequent wages would increase. This
logic also shows that, in a discriminatory environment, “the undervaluation of one group subsidizes
the overvaluation of the other group.”88 From a profit-maximizing perspective, Beckarian analysis
indicates that discriminatory firms have no real incentive to cease prejudicial behaviors if they are
able to offset the increase in wage-prices for their preferred group through paying the discriminated
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group less for the same labor inputs. Yet, as discussed in previous chapters, the problems in these
methodologies of ignoring the pre-market almost entirely persist. Discrimination outside of the labor
market, in access to education or deleterious notions about the roles of a marginalized groups in the
society in question must also be considered in this discussion. To not address this form of
discrimination would be to ignore the potential circumstance that a marginalized group is unable to
enter or be treated fairly within the labor market because their expectations of success may limit their
entry into the labor market. Moreover, if this marginalized group is historically disadvantaged and
typecast as intrinsically unqualified to hold socioeconomically advantageous occupations, their
underrepresentation in the labor market could represent a feedback effect where they choose or are
compelled not to participate in a certain industry because they either fear reprisal or are pessimistic
about their odds of success.
Ultimately, the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method certainly has its problems in
accuracy; however, taking all the appropriate and available corrections as well as understanding the
limitations of regression analysis, it still provides economists with a general understanding of the
degree to which discrimination plays a role in the labor market. For a more in-depth understanding
of the demand-side factors that remains a question, it is imperative to also consider jobdiscrimination, which was addressed in the previous chapter. At the time being, having established
a general understanding of the decomposition method, its issues and benefits, an analysis and
comparison of articles concerning wage-discrimination within certain regions of India, specifically
attempting to observe the changes-over-time in beta-coefficient values of similarly structured
reduced-form equations, is appropriate.89
3.4 Literature Analysis
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Many economists conducting studies of caste-based wage-discrimination have established
that in India’s rural and urban labor market, among full-time workers in varying sectors, a
statistically significant portion of the wage gap between low-caste Dalits and their upper caste
counterparts is attributed to discrimination. These authors’ findings and analyses diverge when
discussing the proportions of the wage-gap that can be attributed to endowment variances as opposed
to identity based discrimination. In other words, the question one must ask themselves here is not
does discrimination exist, it is to what degree can we attribute employer discrimination as opposed
to the endowment effect to the wage-gap. Moreover, many of the authors that will be discussed in
this section have found wage-discrimination is far more prevalent in the private sector, which is not
entirely subjected to the reservation policy, than in the public sector where the policy is actively
enforced While econometric analysis yields figures indicating that the endowment effect outweighs
discrimination on average, the treatment effect’s stability over time is emblematic of caste’s
persistence in certain regions of India.90
To limit the scope of this discussion, the articles discussed in this section will focus on the
regions encompassed by the NSS as well as the IHDS. While these two surveys do not offer data
that amount to a holistic perspective of the Indian labor market, it’s various segmentations and
industries, it is nevertheless useful in constructing patterns of discrimination throughout certain
regions of India. As has been articulated before, the purpose of this paper is not to prove that castebased discrimination accounts for wage-differentials throughout all of India; rather, it is to
investigate and apply a critical lens to the work that has already been done on the subject. In assessing
the outcomes reached by economists studying wage-differentials in different industries across
multiple years, this section concerns itself with the degree to which consensus on caste-based
discrimination can be drawn. Moreover, extending the theoretical work done in chapter one, this
section seeks to locate these findings within the discussion of labor-market discrimination so as to
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assess their overall accuracy. It is imperative that these factors are taken into consideration as to
simply state these author’s findings without delving into their fidelity, the extent to which economic
analysis offers insight into discrimination is stifled.
Firstly, a competitive market framework does not alleviate the problems leveraged against
the Dalits in a manner that many of its proponents believe it to accomplish. To understand precisely
why a competitive market framework cannot solve the issues of India’s caste inequity, it is important
to understand the specific caste-based discrimination that exists as a result of a inherited social
hierarchy that places Dalit’s at the bottom. In Tamil Nadu, Dalit children are regularly chased out of
their classrooms for simply being in attendance and attempting to acquire an education that would
not provide them a monetary return similar to that of their upper caste peers (Basu 2011). In Bihar’s
capital city of Patna, government public distribution shops systematically refuse to exchange goods
with Dalit’s on the basis of their “untouchable” caste identity (Basu 2011). These instances of
discrimination are not solely based on the lack of a stable economic mobility for Dalits within India,
although that is a particularly telling sign of inequality; rather, they are indicative of an
overwhelmingly unreceptive attitude towards Dalits on their caste identity. Whereas a competitive
market framework can potentially erode discrimination under a Beckerian model where ones taste
for discrimination, depending on a variety of variables, is not economically efficient for firms, within
India the caste system functions despite its clear inefficiency. Competitive markets have existed in
India since its liberalization in 1991, and yet few positive tangible changes to the material existence
of Dalits have occurred.
Multiple studies that regress upon NSS data indicates that caste plays a significant factor in
determining wage within both rural and urban labor markets throughout the region encompassed by
the survey. However, to make an accurate assessment of the state of discrimination in the context of
the most recent data, it is imperative to ascertain yields from regressions over time. If discrimination
values fluctuate over time, one could start to make a qualitative analysis as to the effect of affirmative
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action policies on the Indian labor market. Granted, fluctuations in the discrimination values would
not necessarily be the result of affirmative actions failures or successes. Nevertheless, increases or
stability in the level of wage-discrimination over time would lay the basis for the argument of caste
persistence as a social marker that partially determines wages.
Despite discrimination based on social identity’s illegality under Indian labor laws, the
evidence above would suggest that in both the private and public sector, varying degrees of the
wage-gap in the urban labor market is predicated on prejudicial behaviors. Focusing on the urban
labor market, Attewell & S. Madheswaran (2007) analyze the differences in the treatment and
endowment effects among Scheduled Castes (SCs), Other Backwards Castes (OBCs) and NonScheduled Castes (NSCs) between the 38th (1983), 50th (1993-94) and 55th (1999-200) NSS round.
Caste is divided along these lines to allow for comparisons to be made between the surveys as,
prior to 1993, the distinction between Forward Castes and OBCs was not made91. At that time,
caste was delineated within the survey as either SCs/STs or “Others”, the latter category containing
members of both forward and backwards castes. Any comparison of SCs/STs to “Others” before
the 50th round survey, which distinguished between these categories, assumes a certain uniformity
of privilege, or lack thereof, among OBCs and FCs that did not necessarily exist. Thus, if OBCs
experienced a high degree of discrimination and FCs experienced little to none, a wage-differential
decomposed through the Blinder-Oaxaca method to analyze the treatment effect between SCs/STs
and “Others” could erroneously project a lower discrimination coefficient or a smaller wage-gap
overall. Attewell & S. Madheswaran (2007) find that, utilizing “age, level of education, gender,
marital status, sector, job tenure, union status, and occupation” as predictors, the discrimination
coefficient values for the 38th, 50th and 55th rounds encompass 13.45%, 30.4%, and 21.4% of their
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respective wage-differentials92. In other words, discrimination in 1983 accounted for a mere
13.45% of the wage gap, yet ten years later that figure rose dramatically to 30.4% and then fell to
21.4% in 1999. When occupational variables were included in their analysis, the figures in 1993
and 1999 fell to 24% and 20% respectively93. Despite this decrease in the treatment effect, what is
clearly evident is that the percentage of the wage-gap related to discrimination, while falling
between 1993 and 1999, was still significant. This study utilized the Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition method “extended to incorporate selectivity bias [Reimer 1983, 1985], and to
overcome the index number problem]94. However, that the endowment values were falling
between 1983 to 1999 indicated that affirmative action policies were successful, but that disparate
treatment primarily in the private sector as well as unequal returns on human capital investment
were working against the policy measures. A hiring manager in either the public or private sector
with imperfect information who happens to believe that the productivity of an individual is
predicated on caste-identity would likely set wages lower for the caste they do not prefer. The
likelihood of this practice’s occurrence within the urban labor market is justified by the significant
variance in returns on caste-based returns on education calculated in Attewell & S. Madheswaran
(2007). Table 1.1A, taken from Attewell & S. Madheswaran (2007), provides further insight into
this topic.95 For nearly all education levels above Middle (Primary, HSC, Graduate Professional,
Graduate General) and in every survey round, returns on education are lower for scheduled cates
when compared to their forward caste equivalents96. This implies that, in urban labor market firms
that determine wages largely based on education level, scheduled castes would be discriminated
against in that they could have the same education as an upper caste counterpart, yet be paid less
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based on discriminatory assumptions. This could also be in instance of explicit social exclusion;
Max Weber claimed that individuals within upper echelons are likely to monopolize “valued
economic opportunities” and Collins (1979) affirmed this theory to a degree within the United
States by showing how “educational credentialism allows status groups to claim that lucrative
occupations require certain degrees, thus limiting competitions of privileged positions. 97” In this
particular instance, rather than education serving as a means of increasing one’s hire ability based
on their merits and skill-sets, it functions as an indicator of a particular status that allows one to
attain a lucrative occupation. This line of analysis speaks to the notion that perhaps taste-based
discrimination, as conceptualized by Becker, may not sufficiently explain the wage-gap. It is
unlikely that employers face an explicit disutility from hiring low-caste workers, but perhaps it is
their underlying assumption that low-caste workers are less capable despite being similarly
qualified for a particular line of work that contributes to their unequal compensation. Within the
United States, affirmative action programs are perhaps more beneficial from this perspective
because a degree, once earned, could be perceived by companies as a sufficient indicator of
status. However, in India, affirmative

Table 1.1A: Average Private Rate of Return to Education by Caste (in
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action programs that target education cannot, or simply have not, ensured that firms will
compensate these degrees of education equally98. In the context of both the urban and rural labor
markets, Das & Dutta (2007), observing the more recent NSS round from 2004-5 estimate the
wage gap to be .37 log points with a treatment effect of 59%, part of which is determined to be a
result of discrimination in both the labor market and in allocation of pre-market characteristics.99
Table 1.1(B) is taken from Das & Dutta (2007) and illustrates this difference. There are some
differences in the models utilized by Das & Dutta (2007) and Thorat & S. Madheswaran (2007);
Das & Dutta restrict their sample size to ages 20 – 65, they look at both the urban and rural labor
market, correct for selection bias, and utilize a few different controls to account for religion,
settlement type, occupational attachment and industry affiliation. Although the studies are
different, it is worthwhile to note that the wage-gap in 2004 as well as the discrimination value has
increased according to Das & Dutta (2007). Granted, the scopes are varied; however, the
persistence of wage-discrimination over time in this instance affords a better understanding of the
effects of affirmative action at large. Furthermore, in the context of the wage-gap that they too
calculated based on the 2004 survey round, Mukherjee & Majumder (2011) state, “The gap has
also increased over time along with a fall in the endowment effect and a rise in the remuneration
effect. Remarkably, it is only in the case that the effect of endowment was higher than that due to
discrimination in the initial years, although in recent period the remuneration effect has marginally
outweighed the endowment effect here too.” Their work looks at earning disparities between
various social groups beyond castes to determine inter and intra-group disparities as well as the
endowment and discrimination effects in wage-gaps.
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Table 1.1(B): Unadjusted Wage Gap

Mukherjee & Majumder (2011)’s emphasis on the remuneration effect brings up a key insight;
given that public sector jobs are subject to a higher degree of scrutiny in terms of ensuring fair pay
than those in the private sector, the discrimination coefficients, treatment and remuneration effects
are lower in the public sector than in the private.100 Thorat & S. Madheswaran (2007) find that
when separate wage functions are estimated for the public and private sector for the NSS survey
rounds from 1993-4 and 1999-0, the public sector discrimination coefficient is not only less than
the private sector’s, it is also decreasing over time.101 Although caste-based discrimination exists
in the public sector, its decreasing size over the period of time encompassed by the survey indicates
the efficacy of increased labor market wage regulation. While the private sector’s discrimination
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coefficient is decreasing, its size relative to the public sector’s indicates the it’s greater likelihood
to discriminate based on caste. Table 1.1(C), taken from S.Madheswaran & Singhar (2016)
provides more recent analytical work on the discrimination coefficients as well as the endowment
effects.102 Utilizing data from the 2011 NSS round survey. they comes to similar conclusions in
more modern data sets, displaying a trend towards decreased discrimination in the public sector
from 2004-5 to 2011-12.
Table 1.1C’s data is calculated through a standard Blinder-Oaxaca method that, while not
accounting for occupational segregation, provides insight into the trend of the endowment effect
versus the discrimination coefficient over time and by sector. Between 2004-5 and 2011-12, both
the public and private sector see a decrease in the discrimination coefficients, yet the magnitude
of change is drastically different between the two. Firstly, in the private sector the decrease in the
discrimination coefficient is by a mere .2 points, and the endowment effect increases by that very
same margin. This negligible change specifies a lack of equal pay legislation enforcement in the
private sector, and constructs a viewpoint of a labor market free of affirmative action policies, the
effect of which is visible in the public sector. By contrast, the public sector sees a decease in
discrimination by 5.7 points between 2004-5 and 2011-12, which makes sense given the increased
enforcement of equal pay legislation, and points towards the quota system’s partial efficacy. In
order to attain a better understanding affirmative action’s specific role in curtailing the
discrimination coefficient and leveling the playing field per se within the public sector, Das (2014)
examines the 1999-2000 NSS data against the 2004-5 data and comes to the conclusion that
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ST/SCs certainly have benefited from these policies.103 Estimating Mincerian wage equations
based on the experience of wage-earners pre and post-entry into a labor market affected by certain
affirmative action policies, she finds that, when comparing SC/STs and OBCs to FCs, there exists
as substantial effect of affirmative action policies on decreasing the wage gap. However, as she
notes and as will be a subject of chapter four, these affirmative action policies have not
accomplished enough, and the discrimination coefficient’s consistently high value shows that
employers still have the room to discriminate after affirmative action.104
These wage-differentials provide insight into the persistence of a material imbalance between
upper-castes and SCs by indicating the amount of the gap that can be attributed to discrimination.
Taken alone, however, this proportion of treatment to endowment does not elucidate the cause of
discrimination as socially exclusionary, taste-based, or statistical. However, to obtain a clearer
perspective, one must consider increase of the rates of crimes against Dalits, both violent and nonviolent, as well as the increased agitation against SCs by the forward castes that has increased
dramatically in intensity over the past twenty years. From 2006 to 2016, the National Crime
Records Bureau finds that crimes against Dalits has increased by 764%, with the highest increases
located in Goa, Kerala, Delhi, Gujarat, Bihar, Maharashtra, Jharkhand and Sikkim “where rates
rose over 10 times.”105 This article also finds that, between 2006-2016, there were 422,799 reported
crimes against Dalits or SCs. Compounding the issue, while the number of crimes against Dalits
has increased rapidly, the conviction rates remain below 30%. This has led to some figures
estimating the amount of acquittals to be over 74% depending on the year in question, and, with
the amount of false cases staying the same, indicates an apparent inequity in the ability of a Dalit
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to seek justice through the criminal court system. While this article does not detail the nature of
these crimes, nor does it differentiate between crimes against Dalits by Dalits versus those
committed by Forward castes, this increase stands in stark contrast to the claim that general
agitation against Dalits is on a downward trend.
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Chapter 4: Concluding remarks & Policy suggestions
4.1 The Reservation System in the Public Sector
The evidenced marshalled primarily in chapter three points to the persistence of a wage
gap despite the reservation system, and the crux of chapter two demonstrates that differences in
endowments are not enough to explain unequal compensation and under representation of
SCs/OBCs in the labor market. Thus, the natural conclusion is that the efficacy of the reservation
system itself, as well as of affirmative action initiatives at large, must be called into question. Its
success in the public sector as evident by smaller wage gaps is promising in that it indicates that
decreasing the skill gap has led to tangible benefits in Dalit compensation. By contrast, within the
private sector, which is unaffected by the reservation system, the portion of the wage gap related
to discrimination is higher. Ostensibly, the reservation system’s success within the public sector
implies that there could be some tangible benefits to its extension into the private sector. However,
despite the less severe barriers to entry and discrimination apparent within public sector positions,
such as those in the central government, it would be a stretch to claim that the reservation system
is offering SCs and OBCs occupations that would significantly alter their socioeconomic mobility.
For instance, Desai & Dubey (2012) find that “SCs form nearly 60% of sweepers in central
government compared to only 18% of other Class D workers.”106 Jobs that require a higher degree
of education often go to the upper castes, which, as has been discussed at length in this project, is
both a result of the better qualifications as well as their caste identity offering them an advantage
over SCs and OBCs. This suggests that, at least as far as the occupational structure is concerned,

106

Desai & Dubey (2012) section 1.2

Khanna 66

the reservation system’s employment quotas provide SCs and OBCs jobs that do not necessarily
require a high degree of education and whose menial nature align closely with stereotypes
regarding appropriate backward caste labor market positions. Herein lies a fundamental issue with
quota systems as a mode of either increasing a marginalized group’s representation in a particular
market or as a method of increasing their economic livelihood. Even with the introduction of
reservations predicated on caste population share, there is no guarantee that the marginalized
groups will, as a result, have a greater chance of attaining employment that advances the group’s
overall socioeconomic mobility. Of course, decreasing unemployment rates among the SCs and
OBCs is undeniably beneficial to their quality of life. However, if these SC and OBC quotas
primarily consist of low skilled or undesirable jobs with little room for upward mobility, then can
the reservation system be considered effective in its goal of addressing labor market discrimination
as a whole? Given that the quota system, as observed in India’s public sector, has not produced
and does not seem likely to foster an occupational structure that features both high and low skilled
positions appropriately distributed among the castes, the reservation system, as it currently stands,
has not been entirely successful in its goal.
4.2 The issues with Private Sector Affirmative Action
Even if quotas, as they have been structured in the public sector, were imposed in the
private sector, it is likely that they would fall short of actualizing the type of change necessary to
ensure a more favorable, less discriminatory labor market position for SCs and OBCs. Quotas
enforced in the private sector are not necessarily exempt from the fundamental issues apparent in
their lack of success in the public sector. Namely, the issue of SC and OBC overrepresentation in
unskilled jobs would not certainly be alleviated if the private sector were simply required to
maintain a relevant quota. Considering that, in the public sector, the reservation system affords
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backward caste individuals employment in jobs that are disproportionately unskilled and lowpaying, it is conceivable that private enterprises, which are decidedly less affected by antidiscriminatory legislation, would simply meet their SC or OBC quotas in the same manner.
Additionally, perhaps an imposition of quotas in the private sector, given the current state of
agitation against SC/OBC politics within India, observed in part through increasing rates of crime
committed against them, could have a counterproductive effect on Dalits taking the form of
increased upper-caste backlash. Given that the Indian corporate structure is largely dominated by
established upper caste networks, translating the reservation system as it currently stands into the
private sector would not necessarily promote change. It is important to note that this statement is
not made to undermine the potential for affirmative action to remediate the current state of caste
inequality. Rather, this paper makes this argument in regards to the reservation system as it
currently stands, which is problematic because it simply requires that a percentage of positions
within certain public sector organizations must go to SCs and OBCs without specifying a particular
distribution of skilled and unskilled jobs. Ajit, Donker and Saxena (2012) provide evidence on the
nature of caste-based social exclusion among corporate boards in India that offer insight into why
private sector affirmative action may not work. Their study observed 4,000 Indian firms on the
stock exchange, which accounted for 4/5ths of the market capitalization of companies on the
National Stock Exchange as well as on the Bombay Stock Exchange, with the purpose of
discerning the level of diversity among corporate board members. In discussing their findings, they
state, “The empirical results show that caste diversity is non-existent in the Indian corporate sector
and nearly 65$ of the Indian corporate board members are from one caste group – the forward
caste -indicating that it is a small, and closed world. In the corporate world, social networking
plays an important role. Still, Indian corporate boards belong to the ‘old boys club’ based on caste
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affiliation rather than on other considerations (like merit or experience).”107 Sukhadeo Thorat’s
“Reservation and Efficiency: Myth and Reality” reaches a similar conclusion: that upward
mobility among skilled positions in both the urban and rural labor market relies heavily on shared
caste identity, which can potentially supersede the importance of an individual’s credentials.108
Both studies acknowledge that increasing access to education indisputably ties to the betterment
of SC and OBC positionality both within and outside of the labor market, but their evidence
suggest that the domination of forward caste social networks in the upper rungs of many firms’
corporate structure diminishes the role of merit and credentialism. Satish Deshpande’s “Exclusive
Inequalities: Merit, Caste and Discrimination in Indian Higher Education Today” addresses
partially the differences in the treatment of merit along caste lines. Deshpande states that, “The
idea of merit is particularly important as it bears the heavy ideological burden of legitimizing a
system explicitly based on exclusion by discrimination. However, despite the extensive domain of
beliefs, values and norms that merit invokes, in concrete practice it depends on the mundane
mechanism of the exanimation or some variant thereof.”109 This understanding of merit frames
educational attainment in the context of India as a form of upper caste credentialism wherein the
ability to obtain a secondary school or university degree served to distinguish the castes from one
another. Requiring a particular level of education for certain occupations served to legitimize caste
distinctions in a manner that was ostensibly neutral. While discriminating against individuals on
the basis of caste is illegal, demanding that all applicants for a lucrative occupation meet a standard
of education is not. This becomes problematic when one considers that upper caste individuals are
far more likely to not only to meet the basic educational requirements for higher paying positions
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than the backwards castes, but the quality of their education is also likely to be superior to others.
Thus, this form of credentialism can be seen as the upper caste desire to maintain the social order
and power dynamics that have given them a superior socioeconomic position, which can only
survive on the basis of exclusion. Ultimately, the reservation system as it currently stands – loosely
enforced, restricted to the public sector, misguided, and counterintuitive – is not enough to address
the evidently complex issues that face SCs and OBCs in modern India.
4.3 Conclusion & The Path Moving Forward
With all the evidence on caste inequality presented throughout this project in mind – from
the persistent wage differentials to the apparent occupational segregation along with rampant
wealth inequality between the forward and backwards castes, taking into account their origins,
catalysts, agents, and theoretical considerations, this project has evoked a difficult question: what
is to be done? Firstly, with consideration to the theories of economic discrimination, this project
has provided ample evidence against the neoclassical economic doctrines that extoll the
competitive market’s ability to eradicate discrimination in the long run. It has deconstructed
extensively the notions of taste-based and statistical discrimination, arguing that the framework
they are conceptualized within are both unproductive in their treatment of caste relations as well
as inaccurate in their long-run predictions. This project assessed the validity of these frameworks
in describing the situation of caste-based discrimination in the Indian labor market, finding their
approaches to be myopic, restrictive, and restrictive as a whole. Moreover, this project asserts, as
a result of the shortcomings embedded within the neoclassical theories of discrimination, that a
more productive and honest manner in which to delineate and describe observed labor market
inequality is to treat the phenomena as the persistence of social exclusion. Chapters two and three
present extensive evidence that, while certainly not conclusive, labor market inequalities between
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the castes seem to be a result of socially exclusionary forces that operate, persist, and thrive through
in and out-market interactions. In other words, the social order of the caste system, while certainly
less pronounced than in other periods of India’s history, seems as though it remains a prominent
determinant

of

a

backward

caste’s

socioeconomic

positionality.

Furthermore,

the

underrepresentation of various backward castes in white collar industries and educational
institutions, as well as the various wage gaps they experience, result from both an imbalance in
pre-market credentials as well as widespread desires to maintain caste distinctions. In this regard,
to observe labor market discrimination alone does not adequately capture the full extent to which
SCs and OBCs are routinely marginalized against. Ultimately, on these grounds, this project argues
that the issues of caste exclusion and mistreatment in the labor market cannot fully be addressed
by solely affirmative action or anti-discrimination laws. A successful policy agenda would take
into account the ideas purported throughout this project. Legislation should focus on increasing
equality of rights as well as access to public resources between the castes and doubling efforts in
providing SCs and OBCs better education so that the skill gap decreases. Additionally, the
reservation system must be reformed so that it reflects not simply a disadvantaged caste’s
population share, but also the skewed distribution of jobs within relevant industries. Finally, and
perhaps most crucially, extensive anti-discriminatory legislation as well as widespread policy
initiatives designed to uproot antiquated caste values from India’s present-day culture are
absolutely necessary to allow for the reservation system to act as it is intended. Ultimately, change
will only occur when deleterious social attitudes regarding caste as well as the structural
imbalances that have led to average group productive capacities are dealt with in tandem, not as
separate issues.
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